THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SOUL 233 



olism. For this reason, the brute, whose psychic functions are 

 of the organic type exclusively, is destitute of freedom, moral- 

 ity, and responsibility. Deliberate volition, therefore, like 

 conceptual thought, has its source and subject in man's spir- 

 itual soul, and is not a function of the material organism.^ 



*To develop the argument drawn from rational volition for the 

 spirituality of the human soul would carry us too far afield. Those who 

 wish to pursue the subject further may consult Chapter VIII of 

 Griinder's monograph entitled "Psychology without a Soul," also his 

 monograph on "Free Will." 



G. H. Parker of Harvard, though admitting the fact of human free- 

 dom, tries to explain it away in terms of materialism. The following 

 is the description which he gives of his theory: "It is a materialist 

 view which, however, recognizes in certain types of organized matter a 

 degree of free action consistent with human behavior and the resultant 

 responsibility." (Science, June 13, 1924, p. 520.) Freedom, in other 

 words, "emerges" from matter having a peculiar "type of organization." 



This view must be interpreted in the light of the philosophy of 

 "Emergent Evolution," which Parker holds in common with C. Lloyd 

 Morgan and R. W. Sellars. The philosophy in question recognizes in 

 nature an ascending scale of more and more complexly organized units, 

 starting with protons and electrons, at the bottom, and culminating in 

 the human organism, at the top. At each higher level of this cosmic 

 scale we find higher units formed by coalescence of the simpler units 

 of a lower level. These higher units, however, are something more 

 than a mere summation of the lower units; for, in addition to additive 

 properties that can be predicted from a knowledge of the components, 

 they exhibit genuinely new properties which, not being mere sums of 

 the properties of the component units, are unpredictable on that basis. 

 Given, for example, the weight of two volumes of hydrogen and one 

 volume of oxygen, we could predict an additive property such as 

 the weight of the compound, i.e. the water, formed by their combination. 

 Other properties, of the compound, however, such as liquidity, are not 

 foreshadowed by the properties of the component gases. Similarly, the 

 weight of carbon disulphid (CS2) is an additive function of the com- 

 bining weights of sulphur and carbon, but the other properties of this 

 mobile liquid are not predictable on the basis of the properties of sul- 

 phur and carbon. Hence two kinds of properties are distinguished: (1) 

 additive (quantitative) properties called resultants, which are predict- 

 able; (2) specificative (qualitative) properties called emergents, which 

 are unprecedented and unpredictable. Freedom and intelligence, ac- 

 cordingly, are pronounced to be emergents of matter organized to that 

 degree of complexity which we find in man. 



This dualism of resultance and emergence is merely a new verbal 

 vesture for the hylomorphic dualism of Aristotle. The additive proper- 



