234 THE CASE AGAINST EVOLUTION 



Two additional facts may be cited as bringing into strong 

 relief the basic contrast existing between the higher or rational, 

 and the lower or animal psychosis in man. The first is the 

 occurrence of irreconcilable opposition or conflict. The imag- 

 ination, for example, antagonizes the intellect by visualizing 

 as an extended speck of chalk or charcoal the mathematical 

 point, which the intellect conceives as destitute of extension 

 and every other property except position. Similarly, the 

 effort of our rational will to be faithful to duty and to uphold 



ties (resultants) are based on matter, which is the principle of continu- 

 ity. The specificative (constituitive or qualitative) properties called 

 emergents are rooted in entelechy (form), which is the principle of 

 novelty. In fact, entelechy (form) itself is an emergent of matter just 

 as the specificative properties are emergents of matter, with the sole 

 difference that entelechy is the primary emergent of matter, whereas 

 the specificative or qualitative properties are secondary emergents. For 

 in Aristotelian philosophy, entelechy is not, as it is in Neo-vitalism, *'an 

 alien principle inserted into matter" abruptly and capriciously "at the 

 level of life," but a primary emergent and constituent of matter both 

 living and non-living. In fine, entelechy is an emergent of matter in all 

 the units of nature from the simplest atom to the most complex plant 

 or animal organism. The only entelechy, which is not an emergent, 

 but an insert into matter, is the spiritual human soul. Neither the 

 human soul nor the superorganic functions rooted in it, namely, abstrac- 

 tion, reflection, and election, are emergents. Here we have novelty 

 without continuity, and therefore not emergence (eduction), but irir- 

 sertion (infusion). 



In his "Emergent Evolution," 1923, Lloyd Morgan lays it down as 

 axiomatic that emergence involves continuity — "There may often be 

 resultants," he says, "without emergence; but there are no emergents 

 that do not involve resultant effects also. Resultants give quantitative 

 continuity which underlies new constitutive steps in emergence." (Op. 

 cit., p. 5.) Now our proofs for human spirituality consist precisely in 

 the complete exclusion of qiiantitative continuity between organic func- 

 tions (e.g. sensation) and superorganic functions (e.g. conceptual 

 thought and free volition). Hence, by the very axiom which Morgan 

 himself formulates, the human soul and its superorganic functions are 

 excluded from the category of material emergents. If there can be no 

 emergence without quantitative continuity, then the human soul is not 

 an emergent Jrom, but an insert into, matter. Free choice, too, it is need- 

 less to say, is not an emergent of matter, but an expression of the super- 

 material nature of the human soul. So much for the new-old dualism 

 of emergence and resultance. 



