246 THE CASE AGAINST EVOLUTION 



if imagination rather than logic, is to be the dominant consider- 

 ation in science, there is no difficulty in imagining animals to be 

 capable of thinking or doing anything we choose to ascribe 

 to them, as witness ^sop's Fables. But, if sober and critical 

 judgment be in order, then, evidently, from the simple fact that 

 an animal has diversified cries manifestative of different emo- 

 tions or degrees of emotion {e.g. of fear or rage) and capable 

 of arousing similar emotions in other animals of the same 

 species, it by no means follows that such an irrational animal 

 can adapt a means to an end by using mimicry in order to 

 give notification of approaching danger, and to specify the 

 nature of the danger in question. 



This stupid anthropomorphism arises from Darwin's failure 

 to appreciate the fundamental distinction that exists between 

 the "language" of animals, which is indicative, emotional, and 

 inarticulate, and human language, which is descriptive, con- 

 ceptual, and articulate. Brute animals, under the stress of 

 a determinate passion or emotion, give vent impulsively and 

 unpremeditatedly to instinctive cries indicative of their pecu- 

 liar emotional state. Moreover, these emotionalized sounds 

 are capable of arousing kindred emotions in the breasts of 

 other animals of the same species, since organisms of the same 

 species are syntonic with (i.e. attuned to) one another. Hence 

 these reflex or instinctive cries have, no doubt, a teleological 

 value, inasmuch as they serve to protect the race by inciting 

 a peculiar flight-reaction in those that are not in immediate 

 contact with the fear-inspiring object. This so-called warning, 

 however, is given without reflection or intention on the part of 

 the frightened animal, and is simply sensed, but not inter- 

 preted, by the other animals that receive it. 



This premised, it is easy to discriminate between bestial 

 and human language. The former is not articulate, that is to 

 say, the sounds of which it is composed have not been elab- 

 orated by analysis and synthesis into phonetic elements and 

 grammatical forms. In the second place, it is emotional and 

 not conceptual, because it is manifestative of the emotions or 



