TIME 129 



minimum of time without allowing the faintest gleam of 

 memory to pass with it. Without an elementary memory 

 Unking one instant to another there will only be one or the 

 other of the two, consequently, a unique instant, and no 

 before and after, no succession, no time. This elementary 

 memory can be reduced to only just what is needed to make 

 this link. It can be the link itself, a simple prolongation of 

 the before into the immediate after with a perpetually 

 renewed forgetfulness of what is not the immediate anterior 

 moment. Nevertheless, memory will have been introduced. 

 In truth it is impossible to distinguish between duration, 

 no matter how short, which separates two instants, and a 

 memory which binds them together, for duration is essen- 

 tially a continuation of what is no more in what is. This 

 is the true time, I mean the time perceived and lived. It 

 is also every kind of conceived time, for it is impossible to 

 conceive time without depicting it as perceived and lived. 

 Duration, then, implies consciousness, and we put conscious- 

 ness into things by the very fact that we attribute to them 

 a time which lasts. '^ 



One might almost say that these ideas of Bergson are 

 contained imphcitly in Descarte's phrase: ']e pense done je 

 suis.' (T think; hence I am.') 



Here we have the notion of universal time perfectly defined; 

 for, on the subject of knowing whether the universe is divisible 

 or not into worlds independent one from another, Bergson 

 adds:*. . . If the question had to be resolved we would choose 

 in the actual state of our knowledge, the hypothesis of a 

 material time, one and universal.^ 



But there is another difference between space and time 

 which appears to be fundamental. We can travel in every 

 direction in a three-dimensional space. We can, at will, 

 displace ourselves rapidly or slowly, stay motionless or even 

 come back on our footsteps. The same is not true of time. 

 Not only is it impossible to remain motionless, but one cannot 

 ^ Duree et Simultaneite^ 5^ edition, p. 60 and following. 



