PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



dictory entities, which our way of using the terms matter and 

 spirit suggests. 



The fact of man's unity, however, shows beyond any doubt 

 that this suggestion is wrong. The relation between matter 

 and spirit can never be one of mutual exclusion. What then 

 is that relation? 



Above we have seen that neither biological life nor intellec- 

 tual life should be conceived as external additions to material 

 being, but as an internal unfolding or explicitation of material 

 being. To live is the mode of being of an animal, as intellectual 

 life is the mode of being of man. We can put it in another 

 way: Matter, as such, is a reduced mode of being because it 

 is devoid of intellectual knowledge and of organic life. There 

 is, so to speak, a proportion between the degree of knowledge 

 a being possesses and its degree of being. It exists only in so 

 far as it is capable of knowing. That is the consequence of 

 what we have said — namely, that the cognitive faculty is not 

 an addition to matter, but an internal unfolding of its very 

 essence. But is that consequence not absurd? Does it not 

 inevitably lead to the conclusion either that matter does not 

 exist at all or that all matter is endowed with cognitive 

 faculties? The dilemma does not seem very pleasant, for both 

 conclusions seem contrary to reality. Matter does exist and it 

 does not even show the faintest trace of knowledge. Knowledge 

 in its lowest form is sense-knowledge and this knowledge is a 

 property of the higher forms of life, perhaps even of all life, 

 but certainly not of matter as such. It is interesting to note 

 that biologists don't agree on what level of animate nature 

 sense-knowledge is to be assumed. The first traces of it can 

 probably be found with plant-life, but they are not certain. 

 In animate nature sense-knowledge appears as a faculty which 

 gradually takes form and unfolds. This fact confirms to a 

 certain extent the general line of thought we are following. 

 Yet, we need more confirmation than is given by mere 

 speculative extrapolation beyond the realm of life; we need 

 in material activity itself something that although it certainly 

 is not knowledge, can properly be brought in connection with 

 it. Let us try to find this connection. It is not too difficult. 



First of all, it should be remarked that matter is knowable. 

 By being knowable, matter, therefore, is not foreign to knowl- 



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