PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION 



depends upon their usefulness. The whole discussion around 

 finality in evolution has been confused, because the analogy 

 of the concept "fimality" has been neglected."^ 



We have seen above that material activity is a kind of 

 passive activity without self-knowledge. For this reason an 

 evolution from molecules to macro-molecular structures and 

 eventually to living organism is not directed toward a known 

 aim, and in this sense there is no finality. It is, however, an 

 evolution based upon the oature of matter, upon its immanent 

 properties. The course the evolution actually has taken may 

 have been arbitrary and irregular, yet the very existence of 

 the different forms of life show how these forms are the 

 natural results of the material potencies. Since the finality 

 which each form of life exhibits, is based upon the inherent 

 tendencies of its material constituents, the finality of the 

 evolutionary process as a whole is based upon these tendencies 

 too. Finality does not mean that an entelechy works differently 

 from the blind potencies of matter itself, but that the mystery 

 of life is an unfolding of the mystery of material being. 



But now a new problem arises. Is it not a consequence of 

 the line of thought we are following that man too has to be 

 considered the product of the working of these blind tenden- 

 cies? The answer has to be in the affirmative. What else 

 should we expect? For, even apart from the theory of evolu- 

 tion, is it clear that all spiritual activity of man is based upon 

 material structures. The matter-spirit problem is not easy to 

 solve, but it is by no means a problem raised by the doctrine 

 of evolution. The problem already existed and evolution has 

 made it only more acute, because it has given an "historical" 

 aspect to an old ontological problem. Some evolutionists sug- 

 gested that the historical aspect solved the ontological problem, 

 too. The mistake is obvious as we have seen. Evolution offers 

 a possible explanation of the unity of the material world, but 

 it does not explain that world as such, nor the hierarchy of 

 beings in it. It should be clear that when the theory of evolu- 

 tion speaks of man as the product of the working of blind 

 material forces, this thesis has to be taken in the abstract sense 

 in which the theory of evolution considers man. 



■^ Cf. A. G. M. van Melsen, The Philosophy of Nature, Pittsburgh. 

 21954. Ch. V. 



78 



