The Theory of Evolution | 313 



cept as fact that there has been a past and there will be a future, 

 although neither concept is readily amenable to operational analysis. 

 Finally (although not exhaustively), subjective aesthetic standards 

 such as "beauty" are part of the criteria used in judging many sci- 

 entific theories. 



In this book, we have accepted most of these standards and have 

 clung to other dogmata, faute de rnicux. Our reasons are manifold 

 and subjective; in brief, they are that, by accepting these standards, 

 we gain insight which we find pleasing. (It is important for the stu- 

 dent of science to remember, however, that other methods of gain- 

 ing insight may be equally or even more satisfying to others. ) We 

 have, for instance, assumed that events in long time stretches can 

 be induced from knowledge of short time stretches. It is, of course, 

 conceivable that we are doomed to the sort of disappointment that 

 awaited the physicists who thought that the "laws" which applied 

 to baseball could be applied to subatomic particles. 



Being scientists does not, however, absolve us of all responsibility 

 as human beings. One must stand ready to make value judgments, 

 and if necessary to implement these judgments, when scientific deci- 

 sions in the usual sense are not possible. An ardent believer may 

 state that the human population can never be large enough, since 

 for him each soul reflects the glory of a god; a politician may claim 

 that the destruction of a continent is preferable to a change in po- 

 litical or economic philosophy. We could not contend that either is 

 wrong in an absolute sense, but we can easily evaluate both views 

 as inimical to goals that we cherish. The scientist may abdicate 

 political or moral responsibility because the problems involved can- 

 not at present (or may never) be analyzed by his rules. In our opin- 

 ion, he is as culpable as the preacher or senator who does not 

 attempt to appreciate what men can gain from science. Science is a 

 human activity; where it becomes divorced from man, it loses mean- 

 ing. 



The biologist, and in particular the evolutionist, seems to be in an 

 enviable position to help integrate science with other human thought 

 patterns and activities. Physicists and mathematicians have con- 

 tributed so much of the literature on the philosophy of science that 

 an important fact often has been ignored. Unless our sense data have 

 completely misled us, physicists and mathematicians are themselves 

 products of evolution. 



Man is a curious animal, and his curiosity has led to such questions 

 as whether or not there is a reality divorced from the human mind. 

 Indeed, the most important philosophical questions still hover, as 

 they have for centuries, in the area of the mind-matter duality and 

 the nature of percepts. It may be that a thorough understanding of 



