VI FUNCTIONS AND CATEGORIES 121 



them as possible; in that way we shall try to proceed as 

 a matter of method from the apparently simple to the com- 

 plex. We are trying to build up a natural concept of the 

 whole, and for that as well as other reasons we are avoid- 

 ing a recourse to philosophical considerations. The temp- 

 tation is very strong for investigators when they approach 

 the domains of life and mind, so different apparently from 

 that of physical science, to abandon the scientific categories 

 of research for philosophical categories, and to seek for 

 an explanation of the phenomena of life in concepts which 

 sound strange and alien to science. No wonder that most 

 biologists, frightened by this procedure and by this appeal 

 to ideas and methods of which they are traditionally sus- 

 picious, react in the opposite direction, and seek refuge 

 in purely mechanical ideas and explanations of the phe- 

 nomena of life. At first sight the concept of the whole may 

 appear to wear a metaphysical garb; but whatever its occa- 

 sional use in other connections, the intention here is to 

 eschew metaphysics and to hammer out a concept which 

 will supply a real and deeply felt want in the explanation 

 of organic processes, and which will at the same time give 

 expression to the natural affiliations of the phenomena of 

 life with those of matter on the one hand and of mind on 

 the other. We shall follow the scientific clues as far as is 

 in any way possible in the carrying out of this intention. 

 Above all it is necessary to make the concept of the whole 

 as simple, clear and definite as possible. 



Let me repeat what was said in the last chapter: the 

 whole is not a general principle or tendency; it is a struc- 

 ture or schema. A natural body or organism can be an- 

 alysed into two factors: the form, structure or schema, and 

 the concrete characters or qualities which fill up that form 

 or structure. For these concrete characters or qualities we 

 have in every case to rely on experience; the redness, hard- 

 ness, wetness or smell of a thing or the characters of an 

 animal can only be learnt from observation or experience 

 in any particular case. But the form or structure involves 

 features which can be most conveniently generalised into 



