126 HOLISM AND EVOLUTION chap. 



whole ends and the parts begin, so intimate is their inter- 

 action and so profound their mutual influence. In fact so 

 intense is the union that the differentiation into parts and 

 whole becomes in practice impossible, and the whole seems 

 to be in each part, just as the parts are in the whole. There 

 is an intensification of synthesis or unity, as we rise from 

 the mechanical composition to the chemical compound, and 

 from this again to the organic whole; an intensification 

 which is already qualitatively different as between the first 

 two, but which becomes entirely sui generis in the last. To 

 mistake the unity of the whole for the mere mechanical 

 system of dynamics, and the holistic action which shows 

 itself in organic regulation, correlation and co-operative 

 interaction for the readjustment of forces and self-mainte- 

 nance of equilibrium in the dynamic system, is to confound 

 two quite different orders of ideas and facts. The whole 

 differs essentially from the mechanical system; the holistic 

 action or function differs even more essentially from the 

 "action" or "reaction" of dynamics, and from the meaning 

 of those terms as used in Newton's Laws of Motion and still 

 current in the physical science of to-day. 



In other directions too the nature of the whole brings 

 about this intensive transformation of concepts. Let us 

 take the idea of cause and see how it is affected by the con- 

 cept of the whole. The causal idea is quite an interest- 

 ing test to apply to the whole, and it will help to elucidate 

 the point we are dealing with, as well as some other points 

 that concern the nature of the whole. The question, for 

 instance, whether the whole is something different from 

 and additional to its parts is paralleled by the question 

 whether the whole acts as a cause as distinct from its parts ; 

 in other words, is the causality of the whole exhausted by 

 the causal operation of its parts, or is there something over 

 and above the influence of the parts which must be attributed 

 to the whole as such? I have already explained that the 

 whole is nothing but the specific synthesis of the parts and 

 not something additional to them. Similarly the causality 

 of the whole is not an additional factor, but simply the 



