VII MECHANISM AND HOLISM 149 



ultimate effect of transforming and transcending it? Let us 

 return to consider our formula once more from this point 

 of view. We have to consider how elements or entities 

 a and b produce the new unity or entity x different from 

 both; and how this involves the concepts of Holism and 

 Mechanism. For the sake of simplicity I take as an illustra- 

 tion for discussion the case where only two elements enter 

 into the new entity, although usually the number of com- 

 ponent elements is much larger; the illustration will cover 

 all cases irrespective of the actual number of such elements. 

 I also assume that the concept of Holism has been suffi- 

 ciently defined and explained in the two preceding chapters 

 to make its relation to the concept of Mechanism clear 

 without further definition. I need only repeat that the 

 concept of Mechanism involves a system or combination of 

 parts in relation to each other, of such a character that 

 these parts do not lose their identity or substantial independ- 

 ence in the combined role they play in the system. The 

 system consists of the parts maintained in their identity, 

 and its action is the resultant of the independent activities 

 of all these parts. The parts remain, and the activity of the 

 system is the mathematical summation of their activities. 

 That is in essence the idea of Mechanism — a system or com- 

 bination whose action can be mathematically calculated from 

 those of its component parts. 



Now let us test the application of the concepts of Holism 

 and Mechanism to possible combinations or systems into 

 which the elements or parts a and b enter as components. 

 What are these systems in Nature of which we have knowl- 

 edge, and how do they exemplify our two concepts? We 

 find the following possible situations : 



(i) Elements a and b are material elements in the loosest 

 possible mixture without any active relation to each other; 

 this is the case of a mere mechanical mixture, in which there 

 is no combination of any sort whatever and nothing new 

 arises, and to which neither of our two concepts can be 

 usefully applied. The mixture is arbitrary or mechanical 

 in the vaguest sense, but is not and cannot be called a 



