often suggests what we would ourselves do under similar circumstances, so 

 that the behavior appears purposeful. We know that we are able to select 

 lines of conduct that do not come spontaneously. By so choosing, we obtain 

 from the world many advantages that we should not otherwise have; or we 

 escape many dangers or inconveniences to which we should otherwise be 

 exposed. We have a certain control both over the workings of our bodies 

 and over our environment. Or, rather, we have a certain control over our 

 environment by means of the control which we have over our own actions. 

 This control of our own activities comes by way of the most elaborate part 

 of the nervous system, the brain. Nevertheless we cannot say that plants 

 and simple animals act with design, or purpose, no matter how useful the 

 processes are. 



For one thing, we can reproduce the parts of many of these processes by 

 means of physical and chemical mechanisms. For another thing, purpose 

 means nothing unless we assume the presence of a mind like our own, 

 which can thinly of the future \ and from what we know of these organisms 

 we cannot asume that they have such a mind. Indeed, most of our own acts 

 can be shown to be without purpose, even where they are of value to the 

 organism. It therefore makes no sense to attribute purpose to organisms of 

 whose "minds" we know nothing. What they do, like most of what we do, 

 comes from being the kinds of organisms they are; they cannot help it. 

 The wonder still remains: "How come.''" 



34Q 



