IX.] EVOWTION JNl) ETHICS. 219. 



good — whether He is so or not, in our sense of the term, — 

 we could secure a maximum of pleasure, and by refusing 

 to do so we should incur endless torment, clearly, on 

 utilitarian principles, the flattery would be good. 



Mr. Mill, of course, must also mean that, in the matter 

 in question, all men would do well to act with him. 

 Therefore, he must mean tliat it would be w^ell for all to 

 accept (on the hypothesis above given) infinite and final 

 misery for all as the result of the pursuit of happiness * 

 as the only end. 



It must be recollected that in consenting to worship this 

 unholy God, Mr. Mill is not asked to do harm to his neigh- 

 bour, so that his refusal reposes simply on his perception 

 of the immorality of the requisition. 



It is also noteworthy that an omnipotent Deity is sup- 

 posed incapable of altering Mr. Mills mind and moral 

 perceptions ! 



Mr. Mill's decision is right, but it is difficult indeed to 

 see how, without the recognition of an "absolute morality," 

 he can justify so utter and final an abandonment of all 

 utility in favour of a clear moral perception. 



These two ideas, the " right " and the " useful," being so 

 distinct here and now, a greater difficulty meets us with 

 regard to their origin from some common source, than met 

 us wdien considering the difficulties "^as to the incipient 

 stages of certain bodily structures. For the distinction 

 between the " right " and the " useful " is so fundamental 

 and essential, that not only does the idea of benefit not 

 enter into the idea of duty, but we see that the very fact 

 of an act not being beneficial to us makes it the more 

 praiseworthy, while gain tends to diminish the merit of an 

 action. Yet this idea, *' right," thus excluding, as it does, 



