220 THE GENESIS OF SPECIES. [Chap. 



hearing or ut' vision. And, as the quaUty of moral good 

 either must or must not exist in every important operation 

 of the will, we shoukl discern its presence or absence sepa- 

 rately in each ; and even though we never had the concep- 

 tion of more than one insulated action we should be able to 

 pronounce upon its character. This, however, we have 

 plainly no power to do. Every moral judgment is relative, 

 and involves a comparison of two terms. When we praise 

 what has been done, it is with the coexistent conception of 

 something else that in'ujlU have hcen done ; and when we 

 resolve on a course as right, it is to the exclusion of some 

 other that is wrong. This fact, that every ethical decision 

 is in truth a iirefcrencCy an election of one act as higher 

 than another, appears of fundamental importance in the 

 analysis of the moral sentiments." 



From this point of view it is plain how trifling are 

 arifuments drawn from the acts of a sava<>e, since an action 

 highly immoral in us might be one exceedingly virtuous in 

 hini — being the highest j)resented to his choice in his de- 

 graded iuLellectual condition and ])eculiar circumstances. 



It need only be contended, then, that there is a percep- 

 tion of " right " incapable of further analysis ; not that 

 there is any infallible internal guide as to all the complex 

 actions which present themselves for choice. The j^rincipk 

 is given in our nature, the airpliratioji of the principle is 

 the result of a thousand educational inlluences. 



It is no marvel then that in complex " cases of con- 

 science " it is sometimes a matter of exceeding difficulty 

 to determine which of two courses of action is the less 

 objectionable. This no more invalidates the truth of 

 mornl ])rinci}ih's than does the dilliculty of a mathema- 

 tical problem cast doubt on mathematical principles. 



