230 THE GENESIS OF SPECIES [Chap. 



experience of facts, however universal, can give rise to 

 that particular characteristic of intuitions and a priori 

 ideas, which compels us to deny the possibility that in 

 any other world, however otherwise dilferent, our ex- 

 perience (as to space relations) could be otherwise." 



" 2. That the case of moral intuitions is verv much 

 stronger." 



" 3. That if Mr. Spencer's theor}^ accounts for anything, 

 it accounts not for the deepening of a sense of utility and 

 inutility into right and wrong, but for the drying up of the 

 sense of utility and inutility into mere inherent tenden- 

 cies, wliich would exercise over us not more authority but 

 less, than a rational sense of utilitarian issues." 



" 4. That Mr. Spencer's theory could not account for the 

 intuitional sacredness now attached to individual moral 

 rules and principles, without accounting a fortiori for the 

 general claim of the gTeatest happiness principle over us 

 as the final moral intuition — which is conspicuously con- 

 trary to the fact, as not even the utilitarians themselves 

 plead any instinctive or intuitive sanction for thi-ir great 

 principle." 



" o. That there is no trace of positive evidence of any 

 single instance of the transformation of a utilitarian rule 

 of right into an intuition, since we find no utilitarian 

 principle of the most ancient times which is now an 

 accepted moral intuition, nor any moral intuition, how- 

 ever sacred, which has not been pronmlgated thousands 

 of years ago, and which lias not constantly had to stop 

 the tide r)f utilitarian objections to its authority — and this 

 age after age, in our own day quite as much as in days 



fjone by Surelv, if anvthin!:j is remarkable in the 



history of morality, it is the anticipatonj character, if I 



