XIL] THEOLOGY AND EVOLUTION. 281" 



are really consequences of their negative attitude of mind re- 

 specting the most important and fundamental of all beliefs. 



Without a distinct belief in a personal God it is impos- 

 sible to have any religion worthy of the name, and no one 

 can at the same time accept the Christian religion and 

 deny the doguia of creation. 



"I believe in God," "the Creator of Heaven and Earth," 

 the first clauses of the Apostles' Creed, formally commit 

 those who accept them to the assertion of this belief. 

 If, therefore, any theory of physical science really contlicts 

 with such an authoritative statement, its importance to 

 Christians is unquestionable. 



As, however, "creation" forms a part of "revelation," 

 and as " revelation " appeals for its acceptance to " reason," 

 which has to prepare a basis for it by an intelligent 

 acceptance of theism on 'puTely rational grounds, \i is neces- 

 sary to start with a few words as to the reasonableness of 

 belief in God, which indeed are less superfluous than some 

 readers may imagine ; " a few words," because this is not 

 che place where the argument can be drawn out, but 

 only certain suggestions offered in reply to some modern 

 objections. 



No better example perhaps can be taken, as a type of this 

 negative position, than a passage in Mr. Herbert Spencer's 

 " First Principles." ^ That author constantly speaks of the 

 " ultimate cause of things " as " the Unknowable," a term 

 singularly unfortunate, and. as jNIr. James IMartineau has 

 pointed out,- even self-contradictory ; for that entity, the 



1 See 2nd edition, p. 113. 



3 "Essays, Philosophical and Thoological," Triibner and Co., First Scries, 

 1866, p. 190. "Every relative disability may be read two ways. A disipiali- 

 ticatiou in the uatui'e of thought for knowing x is, from the other side, a 



