288 THE GEXESIS OF SPECIES. [Chap. 



degree), or, on the other hand, in terms decidedly inferior, 

 such as those are driven to who think of Hiin, yet decline 

 to accept as a help the term " personality ; " there can be 

 no question but that the first conception is immeasurably 

 nearer the truth than the second. Yet the latter is the one 

 ])ut forward and advocated by that author in «pite of its 

 uuieasonableness, and in spite also of its conflicting with 

 the whole moral nature of man and all his noblest aspira- 

 tions.^ 



Again, ^fr. Herbert Spencer olijects to the conception of 

 God as " first cause," on the gi'ound that " when our sym- 

 bolic conceptions are such that no cumulative or indirect 

 processes of thought can enable us to ascertain that there 

 are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made 

 whose fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether 

 vicious and illusive, and in no way distinguishable from 

 pure fictions.' 



>> 'i 



1 In .111 excellent article on "Variety as an Aim in Nature," in the 

 Xunilter of the Contemporary Rrviriv for May 1S71, tlie Duke of Ai\L,'yll 

 rtunarks : "If th<^re be any work in Xature which rellects any ima;^'e of tlwi 

 Creator, the Iniinan mind is that work. Nor is there any difficulty in con- 

 ceiving how such an image may he true and yet be faint — how it may be real 

 anil yet be distant. For nothing in the human mind is more wonderful than 

 this, that it is conscious of its own limitations. The bars which we feel so 

 much, and against which we so often beat in vain, are bars which would 

 not be folt at all unless there were something in us against which they 

 press. It is as if these bars were a limit of Opportunity rather than a 

 iM)undary of Power. It is as if we might untlerstand immensely more than 

 we can discover — if only some one would explain it to us ! There is hardly 

 one of the higher powers or faculties of our mind in respect of which we do 

 not feel daily that we are tied and bound by the weight of our infirmities. 

 Therefore we can have no difficulty in conceiving all our own powers 

 exalteil to an indofinite degree. And thus it is that although all goodness, 

 and power, and knowledge, must be conceived of as we kntnv them in onr- 

 solves, it dots not follow that they must be conceived of according to the 

 measure which we ourselves su}iply." '' i.oc. cit. p. 29. 



