2 CLASSICS OF MODERN SCIENCE 



learning. For they have tended to stifle and interrupt inquiry exactly 

 in proportion as they have prevailed in bringing others to their opin- 

 ion ; and their own activity has not counterbalanced the mischief they 

 have occasioned by corrupting and destroying that of others. They 

 again who have entered upon a contrary course, and asserted that 

 nothing whatever can be known, whether they have fallen into this 

 opinion from their hatred of the ancient sophists, or from the hesita- 

 tion of their minds, or from an exuberance of learning, have certainly 

 adduced reasons for it which are by no means contemptible. They 

 have not, however, derived their opinion from true sources, and, hur- 

 ried on by their zeal and some affectation, have certainly exceeded due 

 moderation. But the more ancient Greeks (whose writings have per- 

 ished), held a more prudent mean, between the arrogance of dogma- 

 tism, and the despair of scepticism ; and though too frequently inter- 

 mingling complaints and indignation at the difficulty of inquiry, and 

 the obscurity of things, and champing, as it were, the bit, have still 

 persisted in pressing their point, and pursuing their intercourse with 

 nature; thinking, as it seems, that the better method was not to 

 dispute upon the very point of the possibility of anything being 

 known, but to put it to the test of experience. Yet they themselves, 

 by only employing the power of the understanding, have not adopted 

 a fixed rule, but have laid their whole stress upon intense meditation, 

 and a continual exercise and perpetual agitation of the mind. 



Our method, though difficult in its operation, is easily explained. 

 It consists in determining the degrees of certainty, whilst we, as it 

 were, restore the senses to their former rank, but generally reject that 

 operation of the mind which follows close upon the senses, and open 

 and establish a new and certain course for the mind from the first 

 actual perceptions of the senses themselves. This, no doubt, was the 

 view taken by those who have assigned so much to logic ; showing 

 clearly thereby that they sought some support for the mind, and sus- 

 pected its natural and spontaneous mode of action. But this is now 

 employed too late as a remedy, when all is clearly lost, and after the 

 the mind, by the daily habit and intercourse of life, has come prepos- 

 sessed with corrupted doctrines, and filled with the vainest idols. 

 The art of logic, therefore, being (as we have mentioned) too late a 

 precaution, and in no way remedying the matter, has tended more to 

 confirm errors, than to disclose truth.: Our only remaining hope and 



