THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS 17 



and nearer reality. But in truth it is no more 

 fundamental than electricity, and, as we shall see 

 in the following pages, there has been a tendency 

 to conceive matter itself as an electrical mani- 

 festation. Indeed, the theory of relativity leads 

 to the view that matter is a form of energy — 

 perhaps but a property of a combined continuum 

 of space and time. 



Again, it is sometimes argued that mechanics 

 is the fundamental science because its extension 

 is universal, while that of physiology, for example, 

 is not. The contraction of a muscle has clearly a 

 mechanical aspect, while the fall of a stone to the 

 earth has nothing to do with physiology. Even 

 a thought, from one side purely a psychological 

 phenomenon, may have a mechanical aspect if we 

 could trace the physical changes in the brain 

 which accompany it, whereas, it may be said, 

 the expansion of steam in an engine has no 

 psychological significance. Such considerations 

 certainly indicate that the arbitrary plane cut 

 through our solid model of the universe by 

 mechanical science is cut in such a place that it 

 traverses a large part of the model — a larger 

 part, perhaps, than any other section which has 

 yet been cut. It does not follow, however, that 

 it cuts through the whole ; still less that a plane 

 section can represent fully a solid model. Thus 

 the argument that, because of its wide extension, 

 mechanics has some fundamental significance is 

 seen to be a fallacy. It may be prima inter 

 pares of the natural sciences, but nothing more. 

 To go even further than this, as has sometimes 

 been done, and to suppose that the ultimate 

 nature of reality is the same essentially as our 



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