34 THE LIFE OF SCIENCE 



same methods that are used by ordinary historians to appraise 

 and criticize the materials available to them. But the historian of 

 science has to use, independently, some other methods of a more 

 special nature. I cannot explain them here, but it is easy to under- 

 stand that, for instance, to establish at what date a discovery be- 

 came a real part of science and enriched human experience, the 

 historical exegesis must be supplemented by a scientific exegesis, 

 based on the evidence given by the positive sciences. 



We must try to marshall all scientific facts and ideas in a defi- 

 nite order; this means that we must try to assign to each of them a 

 date as precise as possible — not the date of their birth or of their 

 publication, but that of their actual incorporation into our knowl- 

 edge. Likewise, biographers have to exert themselves to find pre- 

 cisely during which periods the influence of great scientists was 

 the most felt, in order to range them in chronological series. This 

 is generally a very difficult thing to do, and the reader will not fail 

 to appreciate the work that is discreetly accomplished by such 

 scholars. Such work of erudition is the bed-rock on which all his- 

 torical writing is built up. 



These remarks complete and add precision to our definition of 

 the history of science. However, it may be well to give some more 

 details about the different exchanges which the historian has to 

 consider in order to put the evolution of science in its proper light. 



I shall successively examine some of the other departments of 

 life which are the most interesting for the historian of science: 

 (1) General history or the history of civilization; (T) The history 

 of technology; (3) The history of religions; and (4) The his- 

 tory of fine arts, and arts and crafts. 



1. Science and Civilization. Since the eighteenth century, and 

 notably under the influence of Vico, Montesquieu and Voltaire, 

 the conception of history has become more and more synthetic. 

 History, the principal interest of which once consisted in military 

 records and court annals, is growing up into a history of civiliza- 

 tion. It stands to reason that a sufficient knowledge of the history 



