118 THE LIFE OF SCIENCE 



program to the fulfilment of which the rest of his life was 

 faithfully and unrestrictedly given. One should keep in mind that 

 at that time Spencer was already a nervous invalid; he could only 

 work a few hours a day and had to use all sorts of tricks to do 

 so without suffering; in the afternoon he had to forsake not 

 simply work but any excitement or he would lose his night's rest. 

 Yet he went ahead and henceforth his life was one of single- 

 hearted devotion to his self-imposed trust. The first volume of 

 the { 'Synthetic Philosophy" appeared in 1862, the tenth and last 

 in 1 896. It took him thirty-seven years. 



It is not part of my present purpose to analyze, even briefly, 

 Spencer's works. I will simply limit myself to a few remarks 

 which may refresh the reader's memory and help him to appreciate 

 Spencer's undertaking. Let us remember that his fundamental 

 ideas are the following : First, an earnest belief in the value of phi- 

 losophy as completely unified knowledge. Of course, without such 

 belief, he could not have carried on his life's work. Secondly, the 

 modern concept of evolution both in its biological and its universal 

 import. Thirdly, the ideal of freedom — the core of his political 

 thought. 



I need not consider the first point because my whole essay is 

 really devoted to it. It is remarkable that Spencer's first paper 

 on evolution, one entitled "The Development Hypothesis," ap- 

 peared as early as 1852, and his system of philosophy, which 

 was essentially based upon the law of progress, was drafted by 

 him for the first time in the early days of 1858. It is in the middle 

 of the same year that Darwin and Wallace announced their 

 theory of natural selection to the Linnaean Society of London. 

 Spencer's merit as a precursor cannot be denied; at the same time 

 it must be said that if his general theory of evolution was right, his 

 conception of its mechanism was wrong. He believed that bi- 

 ologic progress was chiefly determined by the inheritance of 

 characteristics gained by each individual during his lifetime, and 

 although he later admitted the validity of Darwin's explanation, 

 that is, natural selection, he nevertheless, remained a Lamarckian 



