Was the final form of the decision sufficient to result in imple- 

 mentation? 



Did it provide for followup to meet the scientific and political 

 criteria bearing on the decision? 



Assessment of the consequences of a political decision can be made 

 on several different bases. It can be evaluated in terms of — 



The intent of the Congress at the time (with respect to the 

 legislative history of the action); 



The subsequent need for further corrective action (which may 

 indicate imperfection in the initial action taken); 



The sum total of subsequent social benefits and costs of the 

 implementation of the action, as looked at from historical per- 

 spective; 



A comparison of the actual consequences of the action with the 

 conjectural consequences, had it not been taken. 

 The questions to be considered in this study deal centrally with the 

 acquisition of scientific and technological information by the political 

 decisionmakers, to assist them in deciding issues with a considerable 

 content of scientific and technological matters. Accordmgly, the assess- 

 ment of the consequences of the action needs to be made in terms of 

 such questions as the folio whig : 



Did the advice of technical witnesses correctly forecast the costs 

 and benefits of the action at the time it was under consideration? 

 Were subsequent adverse consequences and needs for amending 

 action correctly foreseen by technical witnesses in their testi- 

 mony? 



If conflictmg evidence was given on the issue by technical 

 mtnesses, what evaluation of these different sources can be made 

 in retrospect? 



Did the language barrier between scientific or technical wit- 

 nesses and political decisionmakers result in any lasting dis- 

 advantageous consequences? 

 The general aim of this study is to develop an understanding of the 

 process of drawing from the scientific community information and 

 guidance needed by the Congress in legislating on issues with a sub- 

 stantial technical content. By identifying strengths and weaknesses 

 of past experiences with this problem, it is hoped that the study will 

 contribute to the never-ending process by which the Congress strives 

 to adapt itself to a changing environment. 



By identifying such past weaknesses in the information process as 

 the breakdown in communications between the scientific community 

 and political decisionmakers, the neglect of valuable sources of informa- 

 tion, inappropriate selection of som-ces, and unstructured, unplanned 

 acquisition of data, ways may be found of avoiding possible sources of 

 error in the future. By determining the criteria of effectiveness in the 

 selection of witnesses, in preparing and structuring the acquisition and 

 evaluation of information, in the design of organizational arrangements 

 and procedures, ways may become evident for the more effective con- 

 sideration of legislation at the interface between science and pohtics. 

 If, as seems likely, the role of science in government continues to 

 expand in range and volume, these lessons extracted from the past 

 can serve many useful purposes of guidance for the future. In this 

 endeavor, two things are sure: there will be found no single correct 

 answer, and there will be no definitive finding for once and for all. 

 The subject is too complex to permit of the first, and too dynamic for 

 the second. 



