37 



resulted from the interpretation of the Astin resignation confused the 

 situation rather than chirifying it, and the subsequent hearings re- 

 vealed how variously the issue was defined. 



(a) The issue as presented by Ritchie. — Testimony and exhibits 

 offered by Ritchie in the Senate hearings tilled some 200 pages of the 

 proceedings — pages 9 to 209. Tlie witness based his case on five 

 principal points: 



1. His battery additive was different. It contained a mysterious ingredient or 

 several of them. Or the preparation of the ingredients made it different, or it 

 contained trace elements. An accredited scientist had aided in its development, 

 and had observed differences in its effects from those of the other additives being 

 merchandised.^^ 



2. Tests of the additive showed that it had merit except for those tests that 

 were improperly conducted. Properlj- conducted tests included his own and those 

 at the University of San Francisco physics department, the U.S. Testing Co., 

 and MIT. Those improperly conducted included tests at NBS, and by the Army, 

 Navy, and Air Force. Faults of such tests included: permitting specific gravitj- 

 of electrolyte to go too high, use of uninspected or excessively aged batteries, 

 dirty electrolyte, and a high initial charge sufficient to "ruin" the test batteries.^* 



3. There were many testimonials from satisfied users of the additive, and no 

 complaints. On the other hand, NBS had run no practical field tests. Although 

 military tests were adverse, there were many indications of satisfied users in the 

 military field installations. ^^ 



4. The administrative procedures of NBS were unfair to the vendor of AD-X2. 

 The personnel at NBS held patents on designs of batteries contributing an effect 

 that would be competitive with that of the additive, which showed bias. The 

 NBS Circular 302 was unfair because "the product was condemned about 16 or 17 

 years before it was developed." The NBS Circular 504 was unfair because it was 

 issued before NBS tested AD-X2. The tests performed in preparation for Circular 

 504, by NBS, were declared faulty by Dr. Laidler. Although NBS claimed not to 

 test individual products or report on them by name, they had done so in effect by 

 permitting NBBB to announce the results of NBS tests, naming AD-X2. There 

 was an implication of animus in the vigor with which NBS testified against 

 AD-X2 in the Post Office Department hearing. (Said Ritchie: "The array of 

 witnesses from the National Bureau of Standards was probably the greatest parade 

 of scientists ever to appear before a Government agency in the history of the 

 United States.") ^^ 



5. The NBS contriVjuted technical information and assistance that benefited 

 the stoiage battery manufacturers whose interests were adverse to Ritchie, and 

 did so in a manner injurious to Ritchie. Through the intermediate agency of the 

 NBBB, the battery manufacturers distributed bulletins, circulars, and pamphlets 

 based on NBS data that were critical of AD-X2. The NBBB was in conflict with 

 the Oakland BBB, with which Ritchie had maintained excellent relations, but the 

 NBBB cooperated with the battery manufacttu'ers against him. Close relations 

 were maintained between NBS staff "and NBBB. Also, NBS consulted with battery 

 manufacturers respecting AD-X2 matters. ^^ 



Ritchie summed up his case against NBS in these words: 



* * * The Bureau of Standards condemned battery AD-X2, together with all 

 other additives by implication since 1931 to April 19o0, whether they were tested 



or not * * *. 



The Bureau of Standards has condemned battery AD-X2 through the National 

 Better Business Bureau jjublication, "Battery Compounds and Solutions," over 

 protests, when, by their own admission, they had only tested the material in one 

 or, at the most, two batteries which we and others have determined were not 

 opened for inspection of the samples prior to testing; and the overcharge shown in 

 the test report 504 indicates that the batteries were ruined prior to treatment 

 with the product. That in June 1952, they ran tests on a group of batteries and 

 allowed the acid to go well over 1.280, which action ruined the test. This was 



«3 Ibid., pp. 20-23, 27-28. 44. 



" Ibid., pp. 65, 81. 83, 143, 158, 161-2, 192-3. 



»5 Ibid., pp. 46, 81. 757-76'J. 



»8 Ibid., pp. 52, 63-65, 123, 136, 170, 177. 



»' Ibid., pp. 77, 86, 124-125, 143, 145. 



