40 



currency of validated quantitative data, the rapid circulation of 

 established publications, and the means of repeating procedures 

 under challenge. 



However, the use of science in support of the regulation of com- 

 mercial quality was clearly a relative matter. The resources of science 

 would be quickly exhausted by any comprehensive program of testing. 

 The NBS personnel responsible for the tests of AD-X2 found the work 

 distasteful. There was no obvious way to limit the scope of scientific 

 tests in support of regulation. The rights of the consumer to quality, 

 and the rights of the producer to freedom from arbitrary regulation, 

 had not been probed. Selection of products to be tested seemed to be a 

 chancy process, invohdng at least some admixture of inadvertence, 

 and some of competitive interest. 



Less fundamental, but still pertinent, were the alternatives ])re- 

 sented by the regulatory mechanism in operation that had raised the 

 AD-X2 issue. For example, one issue was as to whether a scientific 

 laboratory should be insulated from possible bias, or imputation of 

 bias, by dealing with the interested parties to a technological con- 

 troversy only at arm's length, and through the medium of a political 

 screening process. Another issue was as to whether the role of the 

 Department of Commerce shoidd be limited to — or should emphasize — 

 the facilitating of product sales, or whether it was also interested — even 

 equally interested — in the maintenance of quality of products accepted 

 by the consumer. Still another issue was: Should Government applica- 

 tion of science serve neutrally but actively as the guardian of the 

 marketplace, or should it be relegated to the development of new 

 products? 



V. Sources of the Committee's Information 



The committee hearing was intended, according to Chairman Thye, 

 to provide "* * * a complete presentation of the facts * * *" that 

 would enable the decision process to take jilace. As the chairman 

 observed, this process was — for this particular case — a diffuse one. 

 It was spread among "* * * the public, the agencies of the Govern- 

 ment, and this committee." ^''° 



Information was formally i)resented to the committee by 15 wit- 

 nesses (in addition to Weeks and Shaeffer, who appeared at the brief 

 preliminary session on March 31). These included Ritchie himself and 

 one of his regional representatives, two scientists (Dr. Astin, of NBS, 

 and Dr. Weber of ^IIT), four industrial technologists offering testi- 

 monials favoring AD-X2, a battery shop manager, and six technol- 

 ogists connected with field installations of the military de])artments; 

 three of these last reported on military tests of the additive (one favor- 

 able, one unfavorable, and one terminated after favorable preliminary 

 results), while the other three attested to favorable experience in 

 field service. 



Testimony of Bifchie before the committee 



In the some 200 pages of his testimony, Ritchie dealt with many 

 aspects of his difficulties in marketing his product. He described the 

 background of his scientific associate and consultant, Dr. Randall, 

 including a notarized description of his technical qualifications. He 



'>» Hearings, op. cit., p. 0. 



