4S 



The science policy issue, least salient from the political point of view, 

 had perhaps the most far-reacliing implications and the most pro- 

 tracted consequences. Because it was not made explicit, its resolution 

 was generalized and adaptive, and not easy to identify. 



The decision processes concerning all thi'ee sets of issues involved a 

 complex of decision points. The role of the Congress w^as as monitor. 

 No legislation was involved in the decisions. This was partly because 

 the committee itself did not have legislative responsibilities, partly 

 because the issue did not appear to be amenable to resolution by act 

 of Congress, and partly because the Admhiistration — through Secretary 

 Weeks as its spokesman — gave assurances that the organizational and 

 procedural changes found necessary to correct the situation would be 

 taken promptly and decisively by his office. 



The decision method in the testing issue 



Although the committee had received information on upward of a 

 dozen different sets of laboratory tests of AD-X2, and many testi- 

 monials from satisfied users and field experience reports, a definitive 

 finding was elusive. For every test there was some criticism as to 

 procedure, sufficient to shake the faith of the committee as to the 

 findings. Originally, the committee had sought to resolve the issue by 

 going to an outside laboratory that was neutral as well as prestigious. 

 MIT's reputation as a practical engineering institution, coupled with 

 its acknowledged scientific com])etence, made it a logical choice. The 

 MIT tests followed on the heels of an extensive set of tests by NBS 

 which had been criticized by Ritchie principally on the ground that 

 the electrolyte was too high in specific gravity. The MIT tests, con- 

 ducted in autumn of 1952, identified eight effects in batteries attribut- 

 able to the addition of AI)-X2. The ^IIT report, as evaluated by Dr. 

 Laidler, seemed to show that these eight effects made the additive 

 meritorious. However, the MIT research people did not make any 

 interpretation of their data, and Dr. Astin rejected the data as derived 

 from an unrealistic condition (in his judgment, the electrolj'te had 

 been much too low in specific gravdty). It was understandable that 

 Senator Sparkman was moved to ask: 'Ts there not some way that a 

 conclusive test for the satisfaction of everybody can be conducted 

 and conducted in such a way that there will be no possibility of a 

 mistake?" '^^ And again — "Is it not possible to devise a test that can be 

 agreed upon by all, so that, if it is run, it \dll be foolproof?" ^^^ 



Four conflicting attitudes seemed to persist among the membership 

 of the committee. One was a profound respect for the institution of 

 science, and for NBS as a great national laboratory. This attitude was 

 conditioned somewhat, as shown above, by irritation that science was 

 unable to provide unequivocal answers to the simple question of the 

 virtue of a battery additive — or at least sufficient to silence the 

 critics. ^^^ A second attitude was the general acceptance of the idea 

 that the Edisonian creativity of the backyard inventor can sometimes 

 accomplish what institutional science has concluded was impos- 

 sible. ^^^The third attitude was a respect for the practical judgment and 



135 I hid., p. 239. 

 ■36 Ibid., p. 383. 



137 As evidenced by Senator Sparkman's questions above. An additional source of irritation, expressed by- 

 Senator Sparkman, ibid., p. 238, was tliat complaints had been heard from small business people that 

 NB S had not given them fair treatment, that it had adhered to its fixed standards without full regard to 

 changes that may take place. 



138 See ibid., pp. 242, 379, and 381. 



