51 



scientists in qnestion ruled out the possibility. Dr. Astin's admission 

 that the Bureau's findings were not absolutely infallible might also 

 be taken as indicative of a degree of flexibility."^ 



Having made the point that the opportunity for impropriety^ Avas 

 at least latent in the NBwS procedures, the committee did not pursue 

 the subject further. It was left to the Department of Commerce to 

 work out its own resolution of the problem. The recommendations of 

 the Kelly committee and the evolution of NBS policy to increase the 

 distance between commercial interest and scientific investigation 

 appear to have disposed of the issue in a gradual way. 



The decision method in the science folicy issue 



The influence of the testing function on the character and program 

 of a Government laboratory was not explored by the committee. Dr. 

 Astin made clear that he did not seek or want regulatory responsibility 

 for ]iis agency."^ The testing function had indeed involved the Bureau 

 in t!ie AD-X2 controversy ; its undesirable byproducts had been shown 

 to include distraction, stress, animus, personnel instability, and a 

 ■veakening of scientific objectivity and disinterestedness. Although 

 the motivation for NBS invoh'ement in the AD-X2 controversy was 

 described as the desire to be helpfid, and a legitimate concern for 

 the interests of the consumer, the consequences were harmful to 

 the A\'ork, the reputation, and the stability of the personnel relations 

 within tire laboratory. ^"'^ 



It was apparent from the line of questioning of Dr. Astin that the 

 committee found the function of a national scientific laboratory 

 difficult to reconcile with that of a monitor of product quality. The 

 members took particular exception to the phrasing of Dr. Vinal's 

 letters to the NBBB inviting comment on the "'legal aspects" of an 

 NBS circular."^ They were also ambivalent about the NBBB itself: 

 on the one hand, it was a constructive, public service organization of 

 merit; ou the other hand, it shoidd not be referred to — as it had 

 been — as a "quasi-governmental" institution.^^" Senator Schoeppel 

 suggested that it was "maybe a little irregidar approach" for NBS to 

 deal with NBBB on such a basis. Although no explicit conclusions 

 were drawn on this matter by the committee, the implication was 

 clear — 



1. That to provide Government support for a private institution engaged in the 

 regulation of business — even in a form of business self-regulation — was regarded 

 with disfa\'or when it adversely affected the interests of small bushiess and bene- 

 fited larger business organizations; 



2. That an arms-leiigth relationship with commercial institutions should be 

 maintained by NBS in matters other than the purely scientific or technical; 



3. That NBS retained a residual responsibility as to the use made of its reports 

 of the results of tests of commercial products. 



The proper scope of participation by NBS in regulatory activities 

 affecting private industry was seen by Senator Ferguson in particidar 

 as quite narrow. By implication, he would lunit it to "matters of 



w8 Ibid., pp. 271-272. Senator Smathers apparently accepted this view. Speaking of Dr. Vinal, he asked 

 Dr. Astin (p. 330) the leading question: "Do you tliink that, having retired and having this experience as 

 an electrician and a battery expert, he should have gone to work for a dairy, for example, or a cement-mixing 

 plant, or do you think it is logical that he went to work for a battery concern?" The disclaimer of NBS in 

 fallibility appears on p. 226. 



»■ Ibid., p. 313. 



w" At various points, Lawrence (op. cit.) refers to the newspaper accounts of threatened resignations, 

 "Lysenkoism," and politically directed scientific research. (See especially pp. 22-23.) 



"« HeirinTS, op. cit., pp. 287, 294. 



ISO Ibid., pp. 244-245. 



