52 



interest to science and technology, broadly speaking, and to manu- 

 facturing interests at the technical level * * *." ^^^ By following a 

 policy of disseminating "* * * technical data, when not specifically 

 directed toward scientific or technological progress, at the professional 

 and production level [suggested Senator Ferguson, the Bureau was] 

 broadening gratuitously and, perhaps inadvertently, into a regulatory 

 activity?" ^^2 



Having demonstrated their concern with this role of NBS, the 

 committee dropped the matter. It was left to the Department of 

 Commerce to find the way to correct the situation. Secretary Weeks 

 in his opening statement to the committee, had promised action along 

 this line, and the policy instrument he selected was the Kelly com- 

 mittee. This group met during the summer and studied broadly the 

 NBS roles and missions, organization, and procedures. Its findings 

 were relayed to the Secretary periodically and were mostly imple- 

 mented as received; the final report of the committee, October 15, 

 Avas accordingly largely pro forma.^^^ 



The issue as to whether Government science should serve regulatory 

 or developmental functions w^as not made explicit at any point in the 

 controversy. The "freedom of science" — that is, the insulation of 

 scientists from political pressiu-es, such as those illustrated by the 

 Astin resignation^w^as indeed an element in the case. But none of 

 the participants expressed the conclusion that the use of science as a 

 part of the regulatory process necessarily exposed it to political 

 pressures. 



Dr. Astin had told the committee that the testing of commodities 

 by NBS amounted to about 1 percent of its total activity, and that 

 more than half of its testing w^as of the commodity cement.^^^ The 

 agitation generated by the AD-X2 controversy, in view of this small 

 proportion of NBS effort devoted to testing, was altogether dispro- 

 portionate to the effort involved. At the same time, the case illustrated 

 the political consequences of the use of science in regulation. Even 

 without deahng with the issue as such, the committee — ^by focusing 

 attention on the controversy, and by the process of factfinding and 

 cross-examination— made the regulatory function sufficiently onerous 

 that NBS thereafter undertook it sparingly and with reluctance.^^^ 



Vn. The Outcome of the AD-X2 Controversy 



The direct consequences of the AD-X2 case evidence the political 

 character of the episode. They were not unequivocal. The methods of 

 politics were used to mediate a conflict that the methods of science 

 would have resolved in a politically unacceptable way. 



The issue did not reach the stage of legislative action. Apart from 

 the technicality that it was presented to a select committee rather 



■51 Ibid., p. 314. 



152 Ibid., p. 315. J J ^ 



>53 See Ad Hoc Committee for Evaluation and Operations of the National Bureau of Standards. Op. cit. 

 Also, Measures for Progress, Op. cit., especially p. 497. 

 iM Hearings, op. cit., p. 212. 



"55 In the words of the official history of NBS ("Measures for Progress," op. cit., p. 485n) : 

 "The action [The Astin resignation and associated events] raised a basic question: whether Governrnent 

 through its regulatory and scientific agencies was to judge the merits of new products offered to the pubhc, 

 or whether this function was to be left to the test of the marlret place. The integrity of the Government s 

 primary scientific research body had been impugned. The Bureau was being subjected to pressure, and to 

 reorganization in accordance with an outside concept of scientific ol)jectivity. The attacli on the Bureau 

 Implied a radical reversal in the role of Government as the regulator of commerce." 



