04 



mit their bafflement at the complexities of the technology on which 

 they were expected to rule.'*^- 



Another objective, the protection of small business from a combina- 

 tion of big business (i.e., the battery industry) and Government, was 

 met in the sense that Government ])articipation in an arrangement 

 that constrained a particular small business was undoubtedl}'- curtailed. 

 The protection of the scientific community in the discharge of its 

 research function while constraining its participation in regulatory 

 activities was achieved, and was almost certainly an objective of the 

 committee. The description by Dr. Astin of the functions of NBS 

 may have helped to define this objective, but it was probably more 

 attributable to the high esteem earned by the scientific community 

 for its achievements in World War II — in which NBS had played an 

 important role in connection with both the atomic bomb and the prox- 

 imity fuse. However, the ramifications of this policy were not explored 

 at the time, and are only beginning to emerge today. It is possible 

 that if the AD-X2 issue had been studied not as an ad hoc problem 

 of an individual businessman versus bureaucracy, but as a matter of 

 principle — if the questions it raised had been enumerated and the 

 issue analyzed as to its broader implications — an altogether different 

 set of witnesses might have been called. The assistance of the National 

 Academy of Sciences in midsummer of 1952, instead of a separate set 

 of tests at MIT, might have helped to dispose of the controversy 

 more quickly and simply. The collection of the great mass of test 

 data by the committee would have been obviated, the parade of 

 testimonials would have served no purpose, and the questioning of 

 Dr. Astin could have been concentrated on the issue of the role of 

 science in regulation rather than on whether or not NBS had per- 

 formed imperfectly in a given instance. However, if the question was 

 not as to the virtue of AD-X2, but as to the use of science in Govern- 

 ment regulation, the Academy's advice might usefully have been 

 sought on this broader issue. The related question as to whether the 

 National Bureau of Standards was an appropriate agent for regula- 

 tory tests or test standards, and how such an agent might be insulated 

 from political intervention on individual cases, might also have been 

 the subject of an Academy inquiry. ^^' As it was, the committee was 

 concerned less in protecting a regulatory mechanism from political 

 onslaughts than in interceding on behalf of an affected small business. 



The gulf in understanding that prevailed in 1953 between the Con- 

 gress and the world of science is perhaps best illustrated by the issue of 

 testimonials versus laboratory data. There was a mutual "credibility 

 gap" between Congressmen and scientists. On the one hand, the 

 committee was unable to reject the force of practical experience on the 

 part of practicing technologists, especially when the money of hard- 

 headed businessmen backed their judgment. On the other hand, to the 

 scientists, testimonials were worthless as evidence because the data 

 they provided were uncontrolled, not quantitative, and usually not 

 even well documented. 



The National Bureau of Standards found itself in the awkward 

 position of trying to prove a negative, in the face of abundant testi- 

 monials supporting the affirmative. In view of the limitless variables 



"2 Hearings, op. cit., pp. 174, 183-184, 304, 377-378, for examples. 



'MTo be sure, the Kelly committee did make a recommendation as to the inappropriateness of NBS 

 to act in the nontechnical aspects of commercial tests. But its finding was made in the narrower context 

 of the question of NBS reorganization to strengthen its scientific capability. On the broader question of 

 scientific regulation by Government per se, the Kelly committee did not rule. 



