58 



present in some minute extent in the situation, no complete, absolute, 

 unqualified, impregnable proof was possible. A negative finding could 

 be arrived at to the satisfaction of the scientific community, by reduc- 

 ing to a negligible level the residual possibility of error. But it could 

 not be reduced to zero. 



Most communications to the Congress appealing for help are from 

 individuals without scientific training, and are based on a layman's 

 judgment and values. Most Members of Congress have legal training 

 in which representation of a client imposes the obligation to accept his 

 story along with the case, and to attempt to substantiate his position. 

 When the scientific evidence is confiictmg, obscure, or indecisive, the 

 congressional conclusion may favor the layman's judgment, especially 

 when backed by abundant practical evidence in the form of testi- 

 monials. From the scientific point of view, NBS may have been alto- 

 gether justified in ignoring testimonials. But from the practical or 

 political point of view, the more testimonials in favor of a product, the 

 stronger and more conclusive must be the scientific evidence to nullify 

 it. 



Among the difficulties encountered by the Senate Small Business 

 Committee in acquiring technical information, there was the problem 

 of scientific language itself. ^^* There was the difference in approach 

 as between the political personality, accustomed to dealing with quali- 

 tative information, and the scientific personality, used to quantitative 

 information.^*^^ There was the problem of obeying the scientific rules 

 in the collection of data.^®^ All of these stood in the way of effective 

 communication between the disciplines of physical science and the 

 practice of politics. 



On the positive side, the AD-X2 episode contributed usefully to 

 public and political education on matters of science. It afforded instruc- 

 tion in the difficidty of conducting unassailable scientific tests of 

 product performance and properties, the vulnerability of tests to 

 criticism, and particularly the vulnerability of scientific tests to 

 practical criticism. It illustrated the importance of controlled scientific 

 tests, the importance of quantitative data, and the importance of 

 requiring technica,l witnesses to arm themselves with careful docu- 

 mentation on procedures and results. It explained the dift'erence 

 between laboratory and field tests. In a broader context, it demon- 

 strated the difficulty of resolving a technical issue in a congressional 

 committee. It showed why political factfinding processes needed to 

 separate the consideration of scientific aspects of issues from the 

 political aspects, and to separate administratively the functions of 

 scientific investigation and political or economic policy formulation — 

 in order to preserve the appearance as well as the fact of scientific 

 objectivity. 



The battery additive controversy also presented the Congress v\'itli 

 a number of difficult policy questions. Some of these were specific 

 to the controversy, as for example — 



Was it important for the examination of the issue that the Post Office Depart- 

 ment, the FTC, and the NBBB were all impacting on Pioneers, Inc., using the 

 data i3ro\ided by NBS? And that the motivation for all three lines of attack is 



164 For example, see Hearines, op. cit., p. 397. Also, see references cited in footnote 163. 



165 Hearings, op. cit., pp. 228-229. 



166 For example, the Academy committee rejected 1 set of data received by the Senate committee on the 

 ground that it was not made with AD-X2. (See report of the Committee on Battery Additives, p. 20.) 

 The Academy committee rejected another set of test data partly on the gi'ound that "* * * the manner 

 of reporting the data does not give confidence in the care with which the experiments were perfor;ned. 

 (Ibid., p. 22.) 



