CHAPTER FOUR— THE POINT JV PROGRAM: TECHNOLOG- 

 ICAL TRANSFER AS THE BASIS OF AID TO DEVELOPING 

 COUNTRIES 



I. The Point IV Problem and Its Background 



This chapter is a case study of the decisionmaking process leading 

 to congressional enactment in 1950 of the first long-range U.S. 

 technical assistance program for the less developed countries of the 

 world, the so-called point IV program. The purpose of the study is to 

 examine the use by the Congress of scientific and technical information 

 bearing on this issue. 



A principal goal of U.S. pohcy following World War II was to shield 

 against Communist encroachment the territories of members of the 

 "Atlantic Alliance." Marshall plan assistance to the war-ravaged 

 nations of Western Europe was a principal means for implementing 

 this policy. Progressively, the scope of this effort was enlarged as other 

 nations, many of them former colonies of NATO countries, sought U.S. 

 aid. Foreign economic and military assistance to a long list of bene- 

 ficiaries thus became a fixture of U.S. policy. 



At the same time, a rapid growth in Communist power was taking 

 place — as exemplified by Soviet achievement of nuclear weaponry 

 and IMao Tse-tung's conquest of the Chinese mainland. Communist 

 technological and territorial gains intensified the stresses between the 

 Communist and non-Communist power systems. One area of competi- 

 tion was in the territories that had been colonies of the European 

 nations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. 



Requirements of all the developing regions for economic assistance 

 quickly threatened to overtax U.S. resources. Unlike the ravaged 

 nations of Western Europe, whose skilled manpower and viable 

 political systems enabled them to make a quick restoration under 

 the stimulus of postwar aid, the developing countries lacked both 

 technological culture and political organization suited to the encour- 

 agement and organization of industrial skills. Assistance under United 

 Nations auspices was slow in materializing. It became evident that 

 the United States faced a choice between curtailing the scope or 

 altering the content of the foreign aid program. 



Accordingly, a search was undertaken for ways to enlarge the 

 effects of foreign assistance without imposing a corresponding drain 

 on U.S. resources of capital goods. Principal reliance was for a time 

 placed on the concept of exporting U.S. technology. In his inaugural 

 address of 1949, the President voiced this aspiration: 



Fourth. We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of 

 our scientific advances and industrial progi-ess available for the improvement 

 and growth of underdeveloped areas. ^ 



1 U.S. President (Harry S. Truman). Inaugural address, Jan. 20, 1949. In U.S. Congress. Senate. Com- 

 mittee on Foreign Relations. Development of technical assistance progi'ams: Background information and 

 documents, Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Programs pursuant to S. Res. 214, 83d Cong. Nov. 22, 

 1954. 83d Cong. 2d sess., Commdttee print. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 53-64. 



(61) 



