82 



The Department also recognized — -although less explicitly — that 

 the lack of knowledge about the developing countries required that 

 the new program be evolutionary and experimental: 



It is * * * impossible to formulate far in advance complete plans for an 

 enterprise of this sort. At this time it is possible to plan only for activities wliich 

 will clearly be successful, and to undertake exploiatoiy and experimental opera- 

 tions in some areas to gain new experience * * *. This is an evolutionary pro- 

 gram.^5 



However, the Department saw less clearly (or perhaps was less 

 willing to admit to) the scale of effort required. In response to a ques- 

 tion from Representative Battle, asking as to the size and duration 

 envisioned for the point IV program. Acting Secretary of State James 

 E. Webb replied: 



Not a substantially larger scale program. This is the beginning of the funda- 

 mental basic policy which we accept in our position of leadership in the world. 

 It is anticipated that it will be a continuing thing for a substantial period of 

 time.^^ 



Perhaps the most telling comment on the administration's easy 

 acceptance of the point IV concept was that of John Kenneth Gal- 

 braith. First, he attacked the glibness of the concept itself: 



Regretfully it is * * * my conclusion that the popularity of the point I\' idea 

 was associated with a sad misunderstanding of the problem of rendering assistance 

 to less favored peoples. During the war a new and damaging phrase, ''American 

 know-how," entered our vocabulary. A rough synonym for organizing, engineering, 

 and mechanical experience, it has gradually assumed the concreteness of a sack of 

 wheat. It is something that can be picked up, exported, planted in far lands where, 

 with proper care, it will flourish to the untold benefit of the inhabitants * * * . 

 For many the charm of point 4 was in the notion that we could deliver this know- 

 how by the planeload to every corner of the world and at little cost to ourselves. ^^ 



Then Galbraith pictured the technical, social, and cultural obstacles 

 bound to confront the technical assistance expert, using agricultm-e by 

 way of illustration: 



Success with agriculture will come only " * * * after a long process of demon- 

 stration and education which, in practice, must also be combined with a good deal 

 of adaptation to the climate, soil, and existing modes of crop or livestock culture 

 of the country * * *. The [Agricultural] Extension Service [of the United States] 

 has always spent a good deal of its time trying to persuade the farmer to sell 

 him — on innovations that are to his advantage. If technical advance requires such 

 extensive educational machinery in the case of American agriculture, where 

 farmers are well educated, alert, and on the whole, predisposed toward change, 

 it is evident that there won't be much progress elsewhere without an equal or 

 greater emphasis on education." ^^ 



All this contrasts with the vision of an American expert, loaded with "know- 

 how'' and USDA bulletins, disembarking on some distant airport to put his cargo 

 at the ser\'ice of an eager peasantry. If tliis traveler is to be useful he must have a 

 corps of helpers for the huge task of training yet another corps of native extension 

 workers. He must be willing to stay a long while and persuade his local recruits to 

 forgo the fascinations of this capital (this is an especially serious problem in South 

 America) for the full rigors of the agricultural hinterland. It will be evident that 

 even in agriculture, where the needed component of capital is relatively small, the 

 operation here pictured is a costly one both for the aiding country and the aided 

 one. 



63 Ibid., p. 7. 



6' In House. Act for International Development. Hearings, pt. 1, op. eit., p. 27. 



" John Kenneth Galbraith. "Making 'Point 4' Work. Some Unsolved Problems in Aiding Backward 

 Areas." Commentary (September 1950), p. 229. 

 68 Ibid., p. 230. 



