84 



preservation of their status, as against the possible — or even prob- 

 able — potential of aided groups to overthrow the status quo, this 

 dilemma was not to be resolved by being ignored. 



Even apart from these considerations, the task of aiding a national 

 economy to grow in a healthy as well as acceptable fashion, which was 

 known by some experts of the time to require a comprehensive and 

 coordinated approach, appears to have been beyond both the means 

 and the technical skUls available for the program. Such an approach 

 was not clearly spelled out untU 1961 w^hen President John F. Kennedy, 

 ill his foreign aid message, called for : 



* * * a carefully thought-through program tailored to meet the needs and the 

 resource potential of each individual country instead of a series of individual, 

 unrelated projects. Frequently, in the past, our development goals and projects 

 have not been vmdertaken as integral steps in a long-range economic development 

 program. '^ 



VI. Evaluation of Aspects of the Point IV Program 



The foregoing sections dealt with the point IV program in its totality. 

 This section discusses briefly a number of particidarly relevant sub- 

 systems needed to stimulate and support modernization and economic 

 growth of an underdeveloped country. The examples selected are: 

 scientific research, personnel required to work in the developing 

 countries, agricultural productivity problems and requirements, busi- 

 ness activity and skUls, labor training and mobilization, education in 

 modern skUls generally, and the overriding aspect of the balance 

 between population mcrease and developed resources. 



The adequacy of plans and the depth of study in these areas seem 

 to be crucial elements in determining the rate of progress toward 

 point IV goals. To what extent had the Department of State examined 

 the problems, ascertained the facts, traced the mechanisms, formulated 

 the policies, established specific operational goals, and provided for 

 essential interactions, in these essential areas? To what extent had 

 the Congress been satisfied as to the adequacy of the planning in 

 these areas? What available thinking among qualified students in these 

 categories remained unused by the Department, and how relevant 

 would it have been in the legislative decision process? 



Research 



The 1950 technical assistance legislation made no provision for 

 systematic accumulation of knowledge about the developing areas. 

 The need for a research capability on the developing areas went un- 

 recognized in the hearings and floor debates. The State Department 

 offered assurance to Congress that previous and ongoing U.S. technical 

 assistance programs, and current United Nations surveys, provided 

 an adequate basis on which to formulate and administer the program. 

 This position went unchallenged. 



Some members of the scientific community doubted that enough 

 preliminary work had been done, but there was no insistent call for 

 more spadework. Surveys of the resource potential of underdeveloped 

 areas were proposed at the MIT Mid-Century Convocation on the 



" President John F. Kennedy. "Special message to the Congress on foreign aid." Mar. 22, 1961. In PubUc 

 Papers of the Presidents of the United States. John F. Kennedy. Containing the pubUc messages, speeches 

 and statements of the President, Jan. 20-Dec. 31, 1961. (Wasliington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 

 1962), p. 206. 



