94 



However, studies circulating within the scientific community in 

 1950 revealed the need for population control measures in the develop- 

 ing countries. In 1946 the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization 

 calculated that it would be an economic impossibility for enough finan- 

 cial resources to be available and a])plied to food j)roduction to keep u|) 

 with the projected rate of population growth."- And in a special Annals 

 study devoted to requisites of an eft'ective point IV program, John Kerr 

 Rose, a geographer with the Legislative Reference Service of the Li- 

 brary of Congress, challenged the economic determinism hypothesis: 



More often than not it is assumed that development will provide self-correction 

 for the population problems faced in a majority of the underdeveloped areas. 

 This * * * is open to grave question. There is no particular reason for believing 

 that areas of other cultures, if and when they industrialize, will necessarily fall 

 into the 20th century Western European-United States population pattern. "=* 



Scientific i)opulation control devices were available in the deveh^ped 

 Avorld in 1950. The controversy surrounding their use in both donor 

 and reci])ient countries attests to their merit. And in spite of the di- 

 lemma over the use of U.S. resources to interfere in the lives of other 

 peoi)le and other nations, anthropologists know today, and knew in 

 1950, that many of the cultures of the less-developed world sanctioned 

 a variety of birth control measures including infanticide, enforced 

 segregation of the sexes, chemical potions, and primitive prophylactic 

 apparati. "^ In their presentation of material to the Congress, the State 

 Department might have given greater attention to the proposition that 

 while technical assistance most certainly woidd lower the death rate, 

 the economic conditions of underdeveloped peoples would not improve 

 unless there were a concurrent lowering of the birth rate, and that 

 artificial means might be needed to achieve this end. The study of this 

 problem and its implication would have been warranted then, in view 

 of its increasingly serious importance subsequently. 



VII — Conclusions 



In advancing the point IV program, President Truman and his staff 

 had identified an issue requiring legislative action: to provide technical 

 assistance to the less-developed w^orld. Both the Administration and 

 the Congress proceeded to assess this need. While the State Depart- 

 ment and other departmental representatives concentrated upon 

 devising a suitable and financially acceptable program, the Congress 

 assessed the political implications and financial costs of carrying it 

 out (pp. 62-71). 



However, there were many gaps in the scientific and technical 

 information supplied to the Congress about the proposed program. 

 Few questions were asked in the hearings to challenge the State De- 

 partment's rationale and assumptions (pp. 71-75). The bulk of the 18 

 months of congressional decisionmaking was spent on mulling over 

 two overriding, nontechnical issues: (1) A group of national and 

 international political considerations directly or tangentially related 

 to the question; (2) the financial approach to be taken, with particular 



"2 Cited by Dennis A. Fitzgerald "World Needs and Resources" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (vol. 

 Vn, No. 4, April 1951), p. 102. 



"3 John Ken- Rose "Needs and Resomces of the Brave New World." Annals of the American Academy 

 of Political and Social Science. Aiding Underdeveloped Areas Abroad, edited by Halford L. Hoskins. (Vol. 

 268, March 1950), pp. 10-11. 



IK For instance see Peter Frver "The Birth Controllers." (London, Seeker & Warburg, 1965.) 



