95 



Csi 



reference to the role of private business (pp. 65-67). Partisan resistance 

 to the program in Congress was supplemented by a resurgence of 

 isolationism, and various issues of particularity. When the ultimate 

 yes-no decision appeared to be in doubt, the President revived the 

 main issue of political and military policy that had been the initial 

 inspiration for the legislation. The companion claim — that to stress 

 the technical assistance aspect of foreign aid would be optimal from 

 the cost/effectiveness standpoint — had appeal in the existing context. 

 It proved to be a persuasive justification for the new i)rogram. 



In retrospect, however, the aid program as a means to contain 

 communism b}' alleviating sources of unrest in developing countries 

 has had only a qualified success. The particular emphasis of the point 

 IV program on the export of technology has become recognized as sim- 

 plistic, incomplete, and on occasion inappropriate. Congressional 

 evaluation of the merits of technical assistance per se was not search- 

 ing or resourceful (pp. 68-80). The assumption of U.S. competence 

 in applied technology was insufficient. Attention was diverted to such 

 perennial issues as funding, the bipartisan foreign policy, and preserva- 

 tion or expansion of U.S. exports. 



Several other factors also diverted attention from the central issue: 

 (!) The Administration was the major source of scientific and technical 

 information for the Congress. While this was a new and admittedly 

 experimental program, the Congress expected the Administration to 

 have adequately evaluated all pertinent information in putting it to- 

 gether. It was not seen by either the Congress or the Administration as 

 an important feature of a national science policy, nor as a component of 

 international science policy; (2) the Administration showed an exces- 

 sive optimism regarding the Nation's ability to engage in an effective 

 program of technical assistance to the less developed world. This belief 

 went unchallenged (pp. 78-84) ; (3) members of the relevant scientific 

 disciplines — including social scientists, civil engineers, and public 

 health experts — who would have supplemented the superficial tech- 

 nical understanding of the decisionmakers, were only mildly active in 

 discussing the program (pp. 76-77). They held information Avhich, 

 if i)roperly evaluated, might have eliminated early pitfalls to the pro- 

 gram. HoAvever, they were not asked to contribute their comments, 

 and did not attempt to gain a hearing. 



Several alternatives were presented in the Congress to the bills 

 sent over by the President. One alternative was to establish a com- 

 mission to study the need for technical assistance, and to determine the 

 character such aid should take. While this alternative proposal use- 

 fully raised some doubts about the scientific and technical aspects of 

 the President's program, it was summarily condemned as a stalling 

 maneuver, and received less serious study than it merited. Another 

 alternative was to give responsibility for program formidation and 

 implementation to the private business community in return for its 

 financial participation. This approach was adopted, in part, along 

 with a program of Government guarantees of private loans. The further 

 alternative of tabling the legislation w^as rejected because the inter- 

 national political costs would have been too great. Accordingly, a 

 small and relatively low-cost, partly private, program of technical 

 assistance was selected. 



