96 



The program enacted by the Congress was a modification of the ad- 

 ministration proposals. The Congress added provisions for better over- 

 sight, more centralized direction, and a larger and more secure role 

 for private business. However, the Congress made no substantive 

 modification of the technical assistance program itself. It is apparent 

 that many of the problems that surfaced in early U.S. technical 

 assistance programs could not have been anticipated ^^^thout a trial 

 run. However, it is also apparent that many other deficiencies which 

 had to be corrected later on by additional legislation, redirection, 

 and funding, could have been foreseen if the Administration and the 

 Congress had made better use of information circulating within the 

 relevant scientific communities at the time. 



It was in the scientific/technical area that caveats were issued 

 regarding the fallability of the belief that the United States could 

 easily and rapidly promote foreign economic dcA^elopment. Among the 

 many cautions expressed by experts who were not called upon, were 

 the observations (later to be confirmed) that the United States would 

 not easily find a supply of quahfied technicians to implement its aid 

 progTams; that economic development could not be fostered Anthout 

 the appropriate admixture of technical assistance and capital transfer; 

 and that it would not be easy to graft the best of a technologically 

 developed society onto the complex and culturally different mechanisms 

 of an underdeveloped nation. (Pp. 81-84.) 



In evaluating the program, the Congress made heaviest use of 

 business and poHtical Antnesses, who discussed business and political 

 issues. The State Department and other officials of the executive 

 branch were expected to be a major source of congressional information 

 in international science policy issues; not only did they need to have 

 the pertinent information, but they were called upon to relate it 

 broadly to domestic and international political objectives. What ap- 

 pears to have been lackuig in the development of the point IV pro- 

 gram, was the evaluation of the specific substantive aspects of the 

 program, and its coherent integration as a practical and frugal opera- 

 tion. It is here that nongovernmental witnesses, experts in particular 

 scientific fields, and critics of foreign assistance policies, can make their 

 most signal contribution. 



