99 



Avas a considerable pool of a\'ailable scientific manpower of high qual- 

 ity. This pool Avas further augmented by an influx of refugee European 

 scientists. This army of scientists, provided with an abundance of 

 supporting resources, challenged by real and urgent ])roblems, and 

 assured of eager acceptance of worthwhile products useful in military 

 or industrial supi)ort of the war, produced an array of novel technol- 

 ogy that Avas quantitatively voluminous and strategically decisive. 



Perhaps most significant of all, the war showed that it was feasible 

 to organize a large-scale mobilization and coordination of scientifically 

 skilled U.S. manpower to achieve a national goal. This teamwork on 

 a national scale was attributable to a combination of cu-cumstances: 

 the acceptance of direction under the stress of a powerful patriotic 

 motive, the moral issue of a war against a particularly ugly political 

 system, the receptiWty of U.S. military forces toward technological 

 innovation, the need for Aveapons growing out of a decade of neglect 

 of U.S. military development, the outstanding leadership of Dr. 

 Vannevar Bush and his associates, and the unlimited resources that 

 the Avartime Congress and Administration Avere prepared to provide 

 for any plausible scientific application that might contribute to the 

 Avar effort. 



From his vantage point as chairman of the Subcommittee on War 

 Mobilization of the Senate Committee on ^Military Affairs, Senator 

 Harley M. Kilgore became acquainted AA'ith the unprecedented Avar 

 role of applied science and technology. The subcommittee had iuA^esti- 

 ga ted the mobilization of scientific personnel, had surA-eyed Avartime 

 scientific programs, had taken testimonj^ on the integration of science 

 and technology into the Avar program, and had Avitnessed the rise of 

 Government outlays on science from $70 million in 1940 to $700 million 

 in 1944. As an outgroAvth of this surveillance, five legislatiA'e goals 

 were perceived as necessary by the subcommittee: 



1 . Government funding for research in the public interest, and 

 especially for defense, health and medical, and basic sciences; 



2. Coordination of Government-supported research; 



3. Stimulation of research by private institutions; 



4. ImproA-ed management of scientific information; 



5. ^Accelerated full exploitation of the fruits of research. 



A bill_ (S. 1297) proAnding for a National Research Foundation to 

 accomplish these purposes Avas introduced by Senator Kilgore (for 

 himself, Mr. Johnson of Colorado and Mr. Pei3per), Jidy 23, 1945. In 

 this initial bill, the scope of research, as proA'ided in section 2-a, Avould 

 have been: "in fields of recognized public interest, particularly national 

 defense, health and the medical sciences, and the basic sciences, in- 

 cluding the social sciences." 



A similar line of thought Avas concurrently pursued by President 

 Roosevelt, Avho sought a Avay to consolidate the mobilization of science 

 for public purposes to serve in the peace to folloAv. In a letter to 

 Dr. Bush, November 17, 1944, he requested adA'ice on Avays in AA'-hich 

 the lessons found in the unique experiment of teamAvork and coopera- 

 tion in coordinating scientific research and in applying existing scien- 

 tific knoAAledge to the solution of the technical problems paramount 

 in Avar could be profitably employed in times of peace. He cited as 

 goals for peacetime science, a fuller and more fruitful employment 

 and a fuller and more fruitful life. There Avere four questions: con- 

 cerning dissemination of scientific knoAvledge accumulated in connec- 



