131 



The rise and demise of Project Camelot 

 A dm inis tration activ ities 



Project Camelot was assigned in 1964 to the Special Operations Re- 

 search Office (SORO) of The American University, under contract to 

 the Department of the Army. In 1958 SORO had received an Army 

 contract to prepare area handbooks describing the social and cultural 

 conditions in the areas of possible future operations for military guid- 

 ance. Under the direction of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 

 SORO's mission was expanded to include research studies on noncon- 

 v^entional warfare, civic action, and counterinsurgency. In late 1963, 

 SORO staffers and officers of the Office of Research and Development 

 of the Department of the Army identified a need to measure ancl fore- 

 cast the causes of revolutions and insurgency in the underdeveloped 

 areas of the world and to prescribe ways to cope with potential insta- 

 bility. The concept was presented to the DOD staff in May 1964.^ In 

 the summer of 1964, the Subcommittee on Behavorial Sciences of the 

 Defense Science Board (DSB), the Department of Defense's scien- 

 tific advisory group, was asked by the Chairman of the DSB to 

 assess the limited warfare and counterinsurgency behavioral sciences 

 program of DOD with particular reference to development in South- 

 east Asia. 



The report of the subcommittee, composed of prominent social scien- 

 tists and DOD personnel, cited deficiencies in both the state of the art 

 and the inventory of quantifiable data "* * * of the internal, cultural, 

 economic, and political conditions that generate conflict between na- 

 tional groups.'' It proposed an in-depth program to mitigate an as- 

 serted lack of understanding with respect to all the developing nations 

 of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.'' During its investigation, the 

 Panel recommended that SORO and the Army start work on the proj- 

 ect in the summer of 1964.' SORO was given $6 million for a 3-4 year 

 project and Rex Hopper, a Latin American area specialist was chosen 

 to be director.^ In its report of January 1965, the DSB Subcommittee 

 recommended that funds be substantially increased to provide for the 

 shift of SORO operations from the library to empirical field re- 

 search — however, it warned that close supervision be exercised over 

 the project.^ 



Although neither the State Department, the Department of Defense, 

 nor SORO have released all of the details surrounding the demise of 

 Project Camelot, the story is pieced together as follows : 



The project was not classified. In August of 1964, the first of a series 

 of reports on the project was released by SORO. It stated that library 

 work was being completed to select those nations which "* * * show 

 promise of high payoffs in terms of the kinds of data required." 



10 



* Behavioral Sciences and National Security, iiearlngs, op. cit., pp. 17-19. 



* Defense Science Board, Subcommittee on Behavioral Sciences. Research in the Depart- 

 ment of Defense on Internal Conflict and Insurgencv In the Developing Countries. Final 

 report of the » • * Jan. 30, 1965 (Washington, Office of the Director of Defense Research 

 and Engineering, 1965), pp. vil, vlll, xl. 



■7 George Lowe, "The Camelot Affair." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 1966). 

 p. 47. 



8 Kalman H. Silvert, "American Academic Ethics and Social Science Research Abroad." 

 American Universities Field Staff Reports Service. West Coast South America Series 

 (vol. XII, No. 3, .Tuly 1965), p. 2. 



8 Research in the Department of Defense on Internal Conflict and Insurgency in the 

 Developing Countries, op. eft., p. 11. 



"Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Life and Death of Project Camelot." Trans-Action (No- 

 vember/December 1965), pp. 4-10. 



