134 



approval of the countries concerned." ^^ On July 7, 1965, one day before 

 the House hearings were to open, the New York Times reported that 

 the DOD insisted that "* * * the State Department had been fully 

 consulted about the project," and that Secretary of Defense McNamara 

 and other officials were undertaking a "top level" review "* * * to 

 determine whether the study should still be held * * * and what new 

 arrangements, if any, should be made for coordination of the study 

 with the State Department." -* The following day, DOD announced 

 that Secretary McNamara had ordered the cancellation of Project 

 Camelot. The cancellation was ascribed to DOD's misgivings about the 

 "technical feasibility of this type of research," and the "practicality 

 of officially sponsored research on other nations which had been "veri- 

 fied by the reaction to news of the project." -^ 



Congressional Inquiry 



DOI^s need for foreign area social science data 



When hearings on Camelot opened before the Subcommittee on 

 International Organization and Movements of the House Committee 

 on Foreign Affairs, July 8, 1965, there were four interlocked questions 

 with wdiicli the committee was to deal. These were : 



1. Did the military security of the United States require a 

 knowledge of the social and cultural factors contributory to politi- 

 cal instability in developing countries? 



2. Could such knowledge be acquired on a meaningful basis so 

 as to yield results on which program action decisions of the mili- 

 tary services could be based ? 



3. What responsibilities for acquiring such knowledge prop- 

 erly belonged with the Departments of Defense and State, how 

 should such responsibilities be properly allocated, and how could 

 the interests, responsibilities, and research programs of the two 

 departments be coordinated ? 



4. As a practical matter, since Project Camelot had been the 

 source of vigorous protest, it had little hope of surviving; the 

 relevant question was whether it had come about as a result of a 

 genuine need and, if so, what alternative means might be found 

 for meeting the need in a way that would be more acceptable at 

 home and abroad ? 



In 3 days of open and closed hearings (July 13-14, August 4) , the 

 subcommittee heard testimony from 10 witnesses from Defense, State, 

 and SORO. The subcommittee was particularly well equipped by 

 previous investigations to deal with the problem at hand. On some of 

 the questions, indeed, it had already formed an opinion which the 

 1965 hearings on Camelot would simply reinforce. As the chairman, 

 Representative Dante B. Fascell, stated at the opening of the hearing : 



In a report which the subcommittee issued last year, we drew attention to two 

 major points which have a direct bearing on today's inquiry : First, we stressed 

 the importance of behavioral research to the effectiveness of our foreign 

 policy * * *. Second, we worried that as a consequence of the overriding require- 

 ments of our military security, too much of our research, conducted in the field 



23 Walter Plncus. "Pentagon Plan to Clear New 'Camelot' Studies." Washington Star 

 (Julv 2. 1965). 



"1 Richard Eder. "Project Under Review." New York Times (July S. 196.5). 



2= Walter Plncus. "Sudden Pentagon Order Kills Camelot Project." Washington Star 

 (July S, 1965), PD. A-1, A-R. 



