135 



of foreign affairs was directed to military ends. We cautioned about possible 

 overmilitarization of our foreign affairs research, and as a result possibly even 

 of our foreign policy."^ 



The survival of Camelot itself as a viable project was not in question ; 

 it had been canceled the day before the hearings began. Prof. Irving 

 L. Horowitz has explored the rationale of its termination and 

 concludes : 



Those negative toward the military used the occasion to criticize the Defense 

 Department's sponsorship of types of research based on intervention into the 

 affairs of other nations, while those negative toward social science used the 

 occasion to note the ineffectual and impotent character of social science vis-a-vis 

 the smooth operations of big diplomats. Project Camelot was thus caught in 

 a pincer maneuver, and it could neither extricate itself nor rely on its asso- 

 ciates to "save" itself.^ 



Nevertheless, to the subcommittee, the broader question of the mili- 

 tary usefulness of applied research in the social sciences was still of 

 concern. Did such research yield valid results? How could the results 

 of such research be used ? Was the Army the proper agent to do this ? 

 At various points in the hearings these questions recurred : 



* * * If we have a political problem in one of our States, we don't send out 

 a military man or economic aid, but people who know about politics * * *. 



* * * When you come to try to create a model of a developing society for 

 purxK)ses of predicting what is going to happen in that society or for purposes 

 of trying to figure out what kinds of things can be done to affect decisionmaking, 

 and the social processes, I do not see the Army is in the game. 



* * * Ultimately our goal for these nations is the development of mature eco- 

 nomic systems predicated on their own sovereignty. When we are working with 

 these nations to help them, it seems to me it ought not to be the military that is 

 providing the main thrust for this, and the research that is involved ought 

 not to be flowing from the military. 



* * * Is there someone in the operational end [of the Army] who has the 

 professional competence to [understand the substance of SORO area handbooks] ? 

 Unless you happen to be a psychologist or a cultural anthropologist or some other 

 kind of behavioral scientist, I don't see how an operations man could evaluate 

 this.=" 



The witnesses abundantly described the evolution of Camelot, its 

 funding, its activities, and its relevance for the Army roles and mis- 

 sions. With respect to this last item, Lt. Gen. William W. Dick, Jr., 

 Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, 

 explained : 



This model that we hope to develop by a project such as Camelot would * * * 

 allow the prediction of social unrest of the kind which would lead to riots oi 

 the kind that could lead to outright insurrection. [And then :] If we knew it. we 

 would undertake planning so that if the American Army were to be sent into 

 this country under this set of conditions, or another, we would have determined 

 where the troops are from, would have better prepared them to operate, and de- 

 termined who would support them. We have to make long-range plans if our 

 future operations are to be successful. * * * This would help us to predict 

 potential use of the American Army * * *.^ 



However, the hearings convey an unmistakable dissatisfaction on the 

 part of the subcommittee, both as to the validity of social science data 

 for applied purposes, and in particular as to the military usefulness 

 of such data. 



28 "Behavioral Sciences and the National Security," Hearings, op. cit., p. 1. 

 ^ Horowitz, ed., op. cit., pp. 20-21. 



28 "Behavioral Sciences and the National Security," Hearings, op. cit., pp. 39, 17, .36, 

 restipctlvely. 

 » Ibid., p. 89. 



