139 



The issue did not receive much attention on the floor in either the 

 House or the Senate. The only evidence of congressional interest in 

 1965 came from some members of the Senate Foreign Eelations Com- 

 mittee, in the context of discussion of DOD appropriations on the 

 floor. A few weeks after the announcement of the President's order for 

 the Department of State to begin reviewing projects for political 

 sensitivity, Senator Fulbright delivered a severe critique of the issue 

 on the floor of the Senate. He saw Camelot as an unwarranted incursion 

 by DOD into the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, 

 and questioned the value of behavioral sciences research in general. 

 His major contention was that the DOD, by its foreign policy activi- 

 ties, was impeding the natural course of events of social change in 

 developing countries : 



I am personally concerned with such projects as Camelot because I believe 

 there lies beneath the jargon of "science" in which these studies abound, a re- 

 actionary backward-looking policy opposed to change. Implicit in Camelot, as in 

 the concept of "counterinsurgency," is an assumption that revolutionary move- 

 ments are dangerous to the interests of the United States and that the United 

 States must "be prepared to assist," if not actually participate in measures to 

 repress them. It may be that I am mistaken in this interpretation ; if so, I would 

 be greatly reassured to have convincing evidence to that effect. 



As to the value of federally sponsored social science research in 

 particular and social science research in general, he said : 



All too often, it seems that re.search is used by Government agencies either 

 for prestige and growth purposes ; or as a substitute for positive decisionmaking. 

 This is both an unhealthy and a costly trend * * *. 



What was needed was assessment of this research by an existing 

 Senate committee or by a specially created group : 



But I am hopeful that before long the appropriate Senate committee, or a 

 special committee, will undertake a thorough study of all our Government's 

 research programs.^i 



Senator Wayne Morse was even sharper in his disapproval of the 

 alleged DOD intervention in internal affairs of a sovereign neighbor, 

 and in the need for executive and legislative view of such research.*- 



Senator Fred Harris, who had just been made chairman of the Sub- 

 committee on Government Research of the Senate Committee on Gov- 

 ernment Operations, announced in the same discussion that one task 

 of his subcommittee would be to assess "the operations of the entire 

 Government research program carried on by all agencies of Govern- 

 ment * * *" and suggested that his committee would review the social 

 science program.^^ 



Senator Harris did not hold hearings in 1965 on the issues raised. 

 However, examination of the Project Camelot incident and its impli- 

 cations continued. The Senate Appropriations Committee released a 

 report concurring with the House recommendations that the DOD 

 behavioral sciences program be reduced by $1.5 million, eliminating 

 Project Camelot. Other DOD sponsored foreign area research projects 



■•^ statement by Senator J. W. Fulbright on Department of Defense research in foreign 

 policy matters. In Department of Defense Appropriations, 1966. Consideration on the 

 floor of the Senate. Congressional Record (Aug. 25, 1965), pp. 20905, 20906. 



«2Ibld., p. 20922. 



« Ibid., p. 20924. 



