140 



were canceled ^* or questioned by foreigners and Americans alike.*' 



jSocial science response 

 The initial response of social scientists to the disclosures about 

 Project Camelot was decidedly ad hoc, ambiguous, and, in the main, 

 not very helpful to decisionmakers desiring to solve the problems of 

 Government-sponsored social research. Herbert Bkmier, a sociologist 

 at Berkeley, has said that the initial " * * * response of social sci- 

 entists to Camelot has been * * * surprisingly mild and nonchalant/' 



I infer from a large number of conversations which I have had that many social 

 scientists never even heard of the affair. Of those who did, seemingly more re- 

 garded it with passing interest merely as an odd and momentarily exciting event 

 even such as might appear anywhere in the news columns * * *. 



Social scientists who expressed themselves on the issue saw nothing 

 wrong with DOD sponsorship and only criticized operational mistakes. 

 Blumer continues : 



Their criticism of it — when they had any — were confined to condemning cer- 

 tain decisions and action in the administraton of the project, as showing poor 

 judgment or mismanagement. For them, the lesson to be learned from the Camelot 

 affair was that of being careful not to get into trouble — to do such things as 

 employing tactful and discreet workers, establishing good lines of communica- 

 tion within the project, maintaining good relations with embassy officials, avoiding 

 involvement in "cloak-and-dagger" activities, and being diplomatic in inter-agency 

 fights."' 



Several reasons explain the relaxed social science response: many 

 social scientists were working for the Government and for the DOD ; 

 they felt that the military had been the major and best source of Fed- 

 eral support for social science research. Thus, when a response did 

 come it favored continuing DOD support. Some social scientists even 

 suggested that social scientists, by virtue of their relationship with 

 DOI), could "educate the U.S. Army so that future interventions in 

 other countries might be more intelligent and benign." *^ Strongest sup- 

 port along this line came from Alfred de Grazia, a political scientist at 

 Columbia, and editor of the American Behavioral Scientist. He as- 

 serted that the project should not have been canceled. He gave his 

 reasons in rhetorical form; major points are summarized below: 



1. Is it not true that since 1940, the Army, Navy and Air Force have contributed 

 incomparably more to the development of the pure and applied human sciences 

 than the Department of State? 



2. Is it not true that the State Department might on dozens of occasions have 

 sought much more extensive research and intelligence facilities than it has actu- 

 ally sought or employed ? 



.3. Is it not reasonable that the Armed Forces mission in respect to in.surgency 

 should include research on areas where revolution might occur? 



■1^ Also canceled in July 1965 was a USIA survey of public opinion in Pakistan. (USIA 

 Cancels Survey Opposed by Pakistan.) (Washington Post, July 27, 19C5, p. A-14.) And 

 on .July 22, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, obtained the cancellation of a T'.S. 

 Army "pro.iect in that country. It was designed to Study "ways of influencing social and 

 political change and the subversive techniques which permit Communists to take advantage 

 of such situations in developing countries." (Walter Pincus, Pentagon Research in Brazil 

 Is Blocked by U.S. Envoy. Washington Evening Star (July 24, 196.5), p. A-3.) 



■^ On July IS, 196.5, Argentine leftists announced they were determined to cancel U.S.- 

 Argentinian cultural exchange and tecliiiical assistance programs financed by pr'.vate 

 foundations. (Subversion Study Stirs Argentines, New York Times, (July 18. 190.5), p. 19) ; 

 John Goshko. Other Research Handicapped by Latin Ire Over Camelot, Washington Post 

 (Aug. 9, 1965), p. 1-A. Some leftists segments in Colombia later objected to another SORO- 

 DOD project. Project Simpatico, designed to study the effectiveness of military civil action 

 programs in that country. The project was later cleared by both U.S. and Colombian gov- 

 ernments. (Simpatico Issue Stirs Colombians. U.S. Study Project Arouses Criticism in 

 Legislature, New York Times (Feb. 6, 1966), p. 32.) 



*" Herbert Blumer. Threats from Agency-Determined Research : The Case of Camelot. 

 In Horowitz, ed., op. cit., pp. 153-154. 



" Letter to the editor from a group of social scientists at Washington University. Ameri- 

 can Sociologist (August 1966), p. 208. 



