141 



4. Are Cuba and Santo Domingo, Lebanon and Vietnam and other cases too, 

 going to stand as historical proof that the Army can send men in to be liilled 

 but cannot help anyone go in to forestall by preventive understanding the occa- 

 sion, of killing? 



5. Is "clearance" so vital to an Ambassador that a large, important project 

 should be destroyed for want of it? 



6. Is it wise for any agency to seek to get a few more research funds by in- 

 vidious comparisons with the worthy research efforts of another department of 

 government ? *" 



The bulk of the social science response came after the State Depart- 

 ment's promulgation of procedures for review of federally sponsored 

 foreign area research in November 1966. But, as Blumer points out, 

 the major concern of social scientists related not to the scientific integ- 

 rity of the study, but to the ''* * * consequences of the affair affect- 

 ing the status of the social sciences * * *." 



CONSTKUCTIVE CRITICISM 



Under the stimulus of this attack, other social scientists began to 

 charge censorship (although they had been influential in securing 

 exemption of NSF, NIH, Fulbright-Hays, and NDEA grants from 

 State Department review). Apprehension was voiced that the "social 

 sciences might suffer a loss in their share of Federal support of re- 

 search."' or that the influence of the social sciences in Federal circles 

 might be lessened.^^ Others asserted that military sponsorship should 

 be Avoided lest access be closed to important areas of foreign data.^° 

 Instances were cited of the cancellation of independently financed and 

 other foreign area researches and the establishment by many foreign 

 countries of their own clearance procedures. Collaboration with na- 

 tive scholars was reported to be damaged, and it was charged that 

 "anti-militaristic" sentiments in foreign countries x^ut American social 

 scientists at a disadvantage.^^ Senator Fulbright's contention that the 

 American and foreign military could not and should not play the role 

 of a modernizing force in the underdeveloped countries found sup- 

 port." Blumer himself was highly critical of the Camelot episode 

 which he saw not as an issue of academic freedom to conduct applied 

 research, but as an encroachment by government on the integrity and 

 objectivity of social science. He was indignant with those members of 

 his profession who did not share these views : 



A similar obtuseness to questions of scientific integrity is to be noted in the 

 case of social scientists operating in some capacity as representatives of their 

 disciplines. Scarcely any references to the Camelot affair are to be found in the 

 professional journals in social science, and where made, the discussion did not 

 perceive the occurrence as threatening fundamental precepts of scientific study. 

 More disquieting is the absence of items in the official proceedings of the various 

 social science societies to suggest that such bodies saw anything in the Camelot 

 incident that was omnious to fundamental ideals of scientific study. One must 



*s Alfred de Grazia. Government and Science * * * An Editorial. American Behavioral 

 Scientist (vol. IX, No. 1, September 1965), p. 40. 



^s Blumer. op. cit., p. 155. 



•'"' Elinor Langer. Foreign Research. CIA Plus Camelot Equals Troubles for U.S. Scholars. 

 Science (vol. 156, June 23, 1967), pp. 1483-84 : and Dale L. Johnson, Department of 

 Sociology, Universitv of California, who wrote the American Sociologist that his own 

 research had been denounced in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. (August 1966), pp. 

 206-207. 



51 John Walsh. Social Sciences : "Cancellation of Camelot After Row in ChUe Brings 

 Research Under Scrutiny." Science (vol. 144, Sept. 10, 1965), pp. 1211-1213. 



52 Marshall Sahlins. The Established Order : "Do Not Fold, Spindle, or Mutilate." In 

 Horowitz, ed., op. cit., p. 76. 



