165 



to be only 28,100 feet deep. The study identified the many scientific 

 potentialities of the project, described the types of measurements that 

 should be made, and developed the concept of dynamic positioning of 

 a drilling ship in deep water. The objective was described as a series 

 of holes into the ocean floor, "Culminating in one that pierces the 

 IMohole and samples the mantle." The project was divided conceptu- 

 ally into three sets of tasks: Phase I would be to modify an existing 

 drilling ship for deep water operations, and to core as deeply as possi- 

 ble using existing technology ; phase II would be the design and con- 

 struction of a new ship, assembling best possible equipment, shakedown 

 tests, and then hole to the mantle ; phase III (which would overlap the 

 two other phases) would include continuous inspection of cores, anlysis 

 of samples, and preparation of reports. Cost estimates were regarded as 

 realistic for phase I (using a maximum of contributed and surplus 

 material). For this phase an outlay of $2.5 million was forecast. 

 AMSOC candidly stated that costs of phase II could only be guessed 

 at because "an estimate of the cost of phase II depends on what is 

 foimd out in phase I." The best guess at that time as to the total cost 

 was $15 million.^ 



The first test of the ]\Iohole concept, in March- April 1961, under the 

 loose organization of AMSOC direction and NSF funding, was sig- 

 nally successful. An offshore drilling ship. Cuss /, was equipped with a 

 stabilizing system of outboard powerplants and propellers, and brought 

 to a succession of drilling sites between Los Angeles and Guadelupe 

 Island, off the coast of Baja California. After a brief learning period 

 at La Jolla, the drilling team in its final demonstration lowered its 

 drill pipe through 11,672 feet of seawater, and drilled 601 feet into the 

 ocean floor. 



A triumphant report on the completion of the phase I test program ^ 

 was issued in April 1961. The necessity for an organizational revamp- 

 ing was already apparent." AMSOC was told by the NAS ]May 22, 

 1961, to disassociate itself and NAS from any management obligations 

 for Mohole, and the AMSOC chairman, Gordon G. Lill, promptly 

 agreed that AMSOC should "concern itself with matters of scientific 

 policy, engineering review, and budget." ^^ From this point on, AM- 

 SOC and its technical staff busied themselves with papers, studies, and 

 detailed questions of hardware and design. The decision function was 

 taken up by NSF. 



At this point some of the complications resulting from the "make- 

 shift" organization of Mohole phase I began to appear. AJVISOC rec- 

 ommended to NSF that phase II be performed under contract by a 

 qualified industrial or academic organization, and that the contractor 

 should be committed under the contract to take the technical staff of 

 AMSOC into its own organization. The Mohole budget recommenda- 

 tions prepared by AMSOC also reflected ambiguities. Although the 

 staff of AMSOC had called for an "intermediate" drilling ship, the 

 committee itself had apparently been responsive to an expression of 



^Ibid.. p. 18. 



» National Research Council. "Experimental Drilllns in Deep Water at La Jolla and 

 Guadalupe Sites." 'The AMSOC Committee of the Division of Earth Sciences (Wash- 

 ington, D.C.. National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1961, Publica- 

 tion 914). 179 pajres. 



lo Testimony of WlUard Bascom, Director. Project Mohole. In U.S. Congress. House 

 Commmittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. "Oceanography 1961 — Phase 2." Hearing 

 before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the ♦ * * on Project Mohole. May 22, 1961. 

 87th Cong.. 1st sess. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 103. 



" Greenberg. Op. cit., p. 184. 



