168 



achievement of a spectacular with (b) protracted data collection em- 

 ploying a large and expensive tool for scientific research, began to 

 reach disturbing levels. 



Related to the question of purpose was that of management. If the 

 emphasis was to be on the collection of scientific data, then the loca- 

 tion of drilling sites — and their number — became of paramount im- 

 portance. Management decisions in the development of project hard- 

 ware would need to optimize for flexibility, transportability, low cost 

 of maintenance, and orderly provision for analysis of specimens and 

 data. If the emphasis was to be on a spectacular achievement, then the 

 design and use of the drilling system needed to be coordinated to the 

 extremely difficult task of drilling a single hole to the mantle. jMore- 

 over, the frequent reference in the contemporary literature to the pos- 

 sibility that the Russians would be first to reach the mantle placed a 

 premium on haste. Achievement of a platform and technology ade- 

 quate to reach the mantle in an environment of urgency boostt^d the 

 costs. It called for too large an element of engineering design risk — 

 too large an extension beyond the state of the art all at once. When it 

 became evident that to maximize its scientific yields the costly drilling 

 platform would need to be kept in operation for some 20 years, the 

 life operating costs were seen to exceed a quarter billion dollars, to 

 be added to the acquisition cost of the drilling system. 



Then there was the confusion inherent in the generation of conflict- 

 ing technical guidance from AMSOC, the contractor, the Office of 

 Science and Technology, the xVcademy leadership, and the NSF it- 

 self. The AMSOC scientists were concerned with maximizing the 

 scientific returns from the drilling. The contractor understandably 

 sought to confine the project as nearly as possible to a straightforward 

 engineering task. Meanwhile, OST was concerned over the interna- 

 tional and prestige aspects of success or failure of the project, par- 

 ticularly if there was indeed a race on. The Academy leadership was 

 concerned to preserve the prestige of science, free from controversy, 

 and therefore sought to mediate the issue with least tension. The NSF 

 was divided in its sympathies among all these conflicting views; it 

 sought to sustain the impetus of an important project in earth sciences 

 but at the same time to support orderly progress in all other fields 

 of science it was sponsoring. 



A lesser issue, but one that tended to obscure the more fundamental 

 questions, was as to the preservation of the "purity" of a scientific 

 project when the very large costs of the undertaking compelled re- 

 sort to an "industry oriented" approach. In the selection of a man- 

 agement contractor for the Mohole project, NSF had been guided by 

 such considerations as: demonstrated competence in managing large 

 marine engineering construction, and relative disinterest in the ex- 

 traction of petroleum from the ocean floor. The contrast between the 

 comparatively low cost, makeshift performance of the phase I experi- 

 ment by AMSOC and the more elaborate, commercially organized, and 

 very expensive project managed by Brown & Root under the tech- 

 nical direction of NSF, tended to place the latter at a disadvantage — 

 in effect tarnishing the political image of the project as the contrast 

 widened. 



