169 



Relevance of the Mohole experience for the future 



Clearly there are many lessons and many unanswered q^uestions that 

 derive from the Mohole episode. If the resources the United States is 

 prepared to invest in basic scientific research are limited, as they are 

 bound to be, then it seems necessary to assure that they are not pre- 

 maturely committed to wasteful projects that the decisionmaking proc- 

 ess in the United States judges should be terminated before they be- 

 come productive. It also seems essential that criteria should be avail-' 

 able to enable sound and lasting judgments on the allocation of funds 

 as between big basic science projects and small projects, as between 

 projects in basic research to advance knowledge and projects in ap- 

 plied science that are intended to contribute specific social advantages. 



Among the questions to be considered are : What were the changes 

 in circumstances as between 1961-63, when the Mohole project was 

 acceptable to the Congress, and 1966, when it was not? If the issues 

 had been properly structured, and pertinent evidence on the issues 

 had been made available in 1963, would the project have been termin- 

 ated then instead of being continued until 1966? Any of the large 

 projects in basic scientific research, such as particle accelerators, the 

 International Biological Program, the space program, research in 

 meteorology, oceanographic research, and various projected uses of the 

 national laboratories, might invite the same start-and-stop sequence 

 that occurred with the jVIohole project. The importance — for both 

 scientific progress and frugal use of resources — of sustained effort on 

 scientific programs seems unmistakable. "^^-Tiat provisions for scientific 

 advice, consultation, and analysis, available to the Congress, would 

 assure that congressional approval and acceptance were sustained 

 throughout each incremental stage of each major j^roject? On this 

 point, there seems to be a relationship between two comments on Mo- 

 hole. One of these, that appeared in Fortune magazine, in April 1964, 

 was that ; "* * * Jf publicly aided basic science is to flower, it must 

 be shielded from operational interference by any sustaining govern- 

 mental agency." [And also:] "Clearly we still have no formula for 

 sound handling of a big science project financed by Government." ^^ 

 The other comment was that in a report by the Comptroller General, 

 April 23, 1968, which suggested : 



* * * Major research and development projects involving totally new or 

 exploratory concepts would be conducted in a number of sequential phases. 

 Each phase would represent a specifically limited agency commitment whereby 

 it would be determined : 



Whether the project objectives could be met; 

 What means would be necessary to attain these objectives ; and 

 Whether the objectives would be worth the costs involved before a con- 

 tractual commitment was made for the procurement of the necessary equip- 

 ment and the actual operation of the project." 



In its rejoinder to this report the National Science Foundation 

 observed that "this suggested approach * * * would not have brought 

 about any decrease in the estimated cost of this project." Nevertheless, 

 the sequential approach would have had the advantage of maintaining 

 a closer working relationship between those responsible for managing 



18 "Mohole Regress Report." Fortune r April 1064), p. 106. 



"U.S. General Accounting Office. "Administration of Project Mohole by the National 

 Science Foundation." Report to the Congress b.v the Comptroller General of the United 

 States. (Washington, D.C., GAO, Apr. 23, 1968), 45 pages plus appendixes. 



