170 



the project and the Congress which had the ultunate responsibility 

 for its approval and funding. Instead, the pomt was made Iniown very 

 belatedly that — 



The prime contractor and, to the best of our knowledge, the National Science 

 Foundation, did not recognize at the time the contract was executed that phase I 

 did not provide a sound basis for proceeding with phase II. Recognition that the 

 problems faced in the two phases were dissimilar came later. Members of the 

 former AMSOC technical staff were employed by the prime contractor as consult- 

 ants, as soon as i)ossible, for the purpose of passing on the knowledge gained from 

 their experience in phase I. It then became apparent that the publicized success- 

 ful phase I operation did not contribute to resolving the many complex engineer- 

 ing problems of phase II.'* 



It is still contended by NSF and by Brown & Root that construction 

 and use of an intermediate drilling ship, as recommended by AMSOC 

 and its technical staff, would not have reduced the total cost of the 

 project, and perhaps would not have accelerated the achievement of 

 the ultimate goal. But the experience that would have been gained 

 with such an intermediate drilling vessel would have — 



Enlarged scientific knowledge of the ocean floor and its various 

 layers ; 



Defined the technological problems of deeper drilling; 

 Enabled the testing of specific new drilling components and 

 techniques; and 



Increased the confidence level of those responsible for techno- 

 logical and political decisionmaking, in the ability of the United 

 States to achieve the ultimate goal. 

 In broader and more general tenns, the advantages of the kind of 

 approach recommended by the General Accounting Office would 

 include — 



More orderly development of technological capability and 

 minimization of engineering risk: 



Orderly production of basic research data yielding opportuni- 

 ties for continuous exploitation through applied research and 

 technological development throughout the evolution of the 

 program ; 



Solid demonstration of the merits and socially useful contribu- 

 tions of research to satisfy the political decisionmakers as to the 

 advantages to the United States of a large-scale, costly, and sus- 

 tained research effort in the earth sciences; 



Training of needed personnel in the many skills required as the 

 project (or program) expanded, with consequent expansion in 

 the manpower with skills in related applied fields; and 



Avoidance of the element of cost inherent in a crash program 

 constantly tending to exceed the state of the art. 

 In short, equipped with a better store of information, and more sub- 

 stantial political support, the NSF would presumably have been in a 

 stronger position to present to the Congress a realistic set of cost esti- 

 mates, more reliable estimates of the time required for the sequential 

 stages of the ultimate goal, and a more tangible and more extensive 

 set of statements as to the probable scientific and teclinological yield 

 of the program. 



^^ Letter from William M. Ricp, project manager, Bro^vn & Root, Inc., to General Account- 

 ing Office, August 11, 1967. In Ibid., p. 57. 



