171 



It is also relevant to note that the task is still to be accomplished and 

 the assessment of its scientific merit in 1966 is still valid. The technol- 

 ogy required to achieve the task has now been more clearly defined. 

 The alternative or intermediate drillmg program, although not identi- 

 fied with the Mohole project, is well underway. The scientific oppor- 

 tunity of the ultimate goal remains to be exploited. The funds expend- 

 ed in the first assault on the Moho are a minor fraction of the cost 

 that will be paid when the project is ultimately carried to completion. 

 What would seem to be required at this point is a dissociation from 

 the scientific goal of exploring the earth, of those unfortunate aspects 

 that led to congressional disenchantment with the project as it existed 

 in 1966. 



II. The Case ix Congress 



The Mohole issue evolved gradually. It is difficult to identify the 

 point at which the rising dollar costs of the project — in effect — began 

 to be regarded as excessive in relation to the anticipated benefits. The 

 early successes of the project were greeted with universal enthusiasm. 

 On scanty evidence, the existence of a race with the Russians to "inner 

 space" was posited. Important additions to scientific knowledge and 

 drilling technology were acknowledged and the promise of great fur- 

 ther rewards recognized with enthusiasm. The initial impetus of the 

 successful first experiment in deep water drilling — almost certainly 

 overvalued to the detriment of the program as a whole — carried the 

 project well into the next phase before the rising costs compelled reas- 

 sessment. The highest echelons of the scientific community gave Mo- 

 hole their strong endorsement, and the only area of technical dissent 

 concerned its rate and sequencing. 



Possible congressional response to AM SO C first feasibility report 



It is interesting to speculate on what might have been the response 

 of the Congress to the issuance in 1959 by AMSOC, through the Na- 

 tional Academy of Sciences, of the first feasibility report of Project 

 Mohole. This report said the project was feasible, acknowledged that 

 it would be a spectacular achievement as well as an arduous under- 

 taking, and characterized the important scientific returns it would 

 provide. What directions might have been taken in a congressional 

 examination of the issue at that early point? Granted, the little evidence 

 and the many imponderables obscured the precise magnitude of the 

 costs. But would it have been worthwhile to consider at the outset 

 whether the United States attached value to spectacular scientific ac- 

 complishment, and if so, in what proportional relation to other goals of 

 society? Precisely what value do scientific spectaculars provide? If a 

 scientific spectacular is decided upon, then how is it to be held in 

 proper proportion — in allocating public resources relative to the less 

 exciting business of making things work better in the cities, the national 

 economy, trade, commerce, transportation, health, poverty, and the 

 myriad of other public problems to which science offers hope of con- 

 tributing to solutions? On what criteria, and from what sources might 

 the members of AMSOC, the National Academy of Sciences, the leader- 

 ship of NSF, or \h^ Congress itself, have derived guidance on such 

 questions as these ? 



