172 



It is not evident that any such sources could have been found in 

 1962; or is there any such source available today. Project Mohole, like 

 Topsy, "jest growed." 



It is a persuasive idea that any scientific innovation, in its earliest 

 stages, cannot hope to marshal congressional support — cannot meet 

 the tests of a pragmatic society. Freedom of basic scientific inquiry 

 implies freedom to transcend the limitations of the "practical mind," of 

 traditional experience, sometimes even of traditional values. Pre- 

 sumably it was this precise reasoning that led the Congress to create 

 the National Science Foundation in the first place — ^to give infant 

 ideas and concepts enough of a chance of life to test their potential 

 worth and significance. 



If so, then perhaps it is unnecessary — even undesirable — for the 

 Congress to attempt to provide criteria of social worth for science 

 projects in their earliest stages. Such a conclusion, however, does not 

 dispose of the question ; it merely postpones it. At what point in the 

 evolution of an inherently vast scientific program, which the Congress 

 will be asked to fund, should the congressional decisionmaking ap- 

 paratus become involved ? When does it become too late to turn back ? 



Congressional assessment foil-owing phase I success of Mohole 



Upon completion of their successful demonstration of the feasibilitv 

 of deepwater drilling, early in 1961, AMSOC began the difficult task 

 of converting itself from an operational team into a technical ad- 

 visory committee. The NSF, having funded much of the initial exper- 

 ment, now began to accept responsibility for initiating the next stage 

 of the progi'am. The questions to be resolved at this point were : 



The maximization of the scientific yield of a project to be 

 conducted in the name of science; i.e., establishment of the 

 priorities ; 



The administrative formula required to manage the continua- 

 tion of the program : 



The programing of follow-on work ; 



The development of a realistic assessment of the costs, technical 

 difficulties, and time required for the total program. 

 All these questions were interdependent. Decisions as to tlie "next 

 step" depended on a realistic evaluation as to the difficulty of achieving 

 the ultimate goal. The scientific rewards of various approaches needed 

 to be related to alternative estimates of costs. The time required to 

 achieve the ultimate objective depended on such considerations as the 

 priority to be accorded the physical feat as against the acquisition of 

 scientific information. Even in the acquisition of scientific informa- 

 tion, it was necessary to determine priorities— as between extensive 

 drilling to obtain more knowledge about tlie total crustal structure, 

 and intensive drilling to obtain a first set of data regarding the sub- 

 crustal composition and structure. (This last was uncommonlv difficult 

 because the opportunities for acquiring scientific information in this 

 unexploited area were so vast that almost any effort would be scientific- 

 all v rewarding. The great wealth of opportunitv made selectivity 

 difficult.) 



In the appropriations hearings in the House of Pepresentatives, 

 shortly after completion of the intial deep water drilling experiment,, 



