183 



Haworth. It said that "the Panel feels strongly that the Mohole 

 program should be prosecuted with great vigor, and that funds should 

 be made available now for the construction of the necessary drillmg 

 vehicles." The Panel "unanimously" agreed that an intermediate drill- 

 ing vehicle should be constructed "promptly," but that "this should 

 in no way impede the design and construction of the final vehicle by 

 Brown & Root." *« 



It is evident that by the end of 1963 the scientific community had 

 dropped the idea of a race to the mantle, in favor of a more cautious, 

 deliberate, reasonably paced, and hopefully less costly program of 

 broader scope. The sense of urgency still pervaded NSF and the con- 

 tractor. Although Dr. Haworth evidently appreciated the force of the 

 AMSOC appeal for a broad-based program of scientific investigation, 

 he still gave priority — or perhaps was committed — to the initial goal 

 of Mohole. A modest program of ocean sediment drilling, proposed 

 by NSF, failed to win approval of the Bureau of the Budget for 

 1965, while the NSF was authorized by the Bureau to proceed with 

 its construction plans for Mohole. 



The immediate outcome of the two hearings was that the Mohole 

 project, including the ultimate drilling platform, received the green 

 light. The President's 1964 budget message contained an item of $25 

 million for its continuation. On the other hand, the review brought 

 no major change in organization of the project. AMSOC as a source 

 of formal criticism and policy recommendations had been eliminated.*^ 

 And Mohole itself would thereafter remain vulnerable to the charge 

 that it represented a priority for the science spectacular, at the ex- 

 pense of a scientific program. 



NSF interrogation hy Subcommittee on Scienxie^ Research^ and 

 Development 



A different approach to the acquisition of program information on 

 Mohole was explored by a subcommittee of the House Committee on 

 Science and Astronautics. A letter was sent to the Foundation, July 

 17, 1965, over the signature of Representative Emilio Q. Daddario, 

 chairman of the subcommittee, presenting more than 100 questions as 

 to various aspects of the NSF program, policies, organization, and 

 funding. In one section. National Research Programs of NSF, there 

 were six questions directed at the Mohole project. Five of the ques- 

 tions sought information about Mohole's objectives, accrued and ex- 

 pected benefits, status, platform construction progress, technical prob- 

 lems and their solutions, the prospect of follow-on activity, expected 

 completion, and cost data. 



The response, transmitted by Director Haworth August 16, 1965, 

 made clear that NSF was increasingly regarding Mohole as a continu- 

 ing activity rather than a race to the mantle. While the reaching of 

 the mantle was the "most difficult objective" of the project — 



we consider this Project as bnt one aspect of a program with a much broader 

 aim of exploring the sea floor by deep drilling in as many of the world's oceanic 

 regions as possible * * *. 



Placing the program in its proper perspective, we may state that the Mohole 

 project will lead the way toward opening the deep portions of the earth to the 

 direct scnitiny and analysis of scientists. 



^ Senate. Independent offices appropriations, 1964, op. cit., pp. 2376-2377. 

 * On Jan. 18, 1964, the committee voted unanimously to disband. 



