191 



to correct this deficiency. Many other questions do not appear to have 

 been searched out. Some of these are : 



Who was responsible for determining whether the Mohole plat- 

 form and drilling system were within the state of the art, and on 

 what basis was the decision made ? 



What was the proper rate of progress on such a large scientific 

 task, and what criteria determined this? 



If this project (or program) was aimed at securing national 

 scientific prestige for the United States, how should this intangible 

 be weighted against other more concrete values and costs? How 

 was it to be exploited ? Was there a genuine need for haste ? 

 In retrospect, there would seem to have been a need for an appro- 

 priate committee of Congress, and a staff conversant with the details 

 of the project, to have explored : 



The scientific, technological, and social significance of full ex- 

 ploitation of the deep ocean drilling capability; 

 The military significance of the evolving project; 

 The national implications of oceanography, as affected by the 

 newly developed, deep ocean drilling capability ; 



The application of all available criteria of the national interest 

 to establish the concept for the sort of "tool" that would best 

 serve the many potential national purposes; 



An evaluation of the difficulties to be encountered in the 

 program. 

 Finally, the funding of the project seems to have been the crucial 

 question. It was the sole means by which the Congress exercised con- 

 trol over the project. As a political device of control, the appropria- 

 tions process is powerful, l^ut not selective. (The management of ap- 

 propriations could terminate the project, but could not assure it the 

 kind of management needed for its success.) Such a control mechanism 

 is least compatible with respect to the management of basic research. 

 Fortune magazine hit at one aspect of this when it stated : "Clearly, 

 we still have no formula for sound handling of a big science project 

 financed by Government." Also, "* * * if publicly aided basic re- 

 search is to flower, it must be shielded from operational interference 

 by any sustaining governmental agency." ^^ Another aspect is that 

 identified by D. S. Greenberg: "The very nature of basic research 

 makes it difficult to promise an}i:hing more than tlie probability of a 

 payoff, but this perhaps makes it all the more important to demon- 

 strate that this uncertain process will at least be conducted with pru- 

 dent concern for the taxpayers' money." ^^ 



For the Congress to decide among the priorities to be assigned 

 various basic research projects in competition with other uses of 

 national resources requires basic objective assessment of the technical 

 values of each project. In the final Senate appropriations hearings on 

 Mohole, Senator Magnuson described the quandary facing congres- 

 sional decisionmakers on this matter : 



I think the question we have to ask is, Are we going to try and limit the 

 amount of research within the capabilities of the country, as far as the Federal 



•" "Mohole Repress Report," op. clt. (April 1964), p. 106. 



''D. S. Greenberg. "Mohole: Senate Is Asked To Restore Funds." Science (vol. 153, 

 July 1966), p. 39. 



