194 



most element of U.S. nuclear policy. At the same time, opponents of the 

 treaty were describing it as a trap, a diplomatic defeat at the hands 

 of the Soviet Union, and a unilateral sacrifice of nuclear supremacy 

 by the United States. 



Once the treaty had been ratified and made effective, it produced 

 merely a slight slowing down of the arms race, and a modest easing of 

 tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. Even as to 

 nuclear proliferation, supporters of the treaty had hoped it would deter 

 new entrants to the group of nuclear-armed nations ; yet it did no more 

 than lend slight rigidity to a status quo. Established nuclear powers 

 continued underground nuclear tests; the French continued to pre- 

 pare for atmospheric tests of thermonuclear devices ; the Chinese Com- 

 munists maintained their quest for an initial nuclear capability ; yet, 

 the treaty may have influenced other nations with a nuclear potential 

 to abstain from developing and testing. 



The test ban treaty was the subject of 2 extensive sets of committee 

 hearings and 3 weeks of debate on the Senate floor. The purpose of this 

 study is to examine the evidence assembled by the committees, to dis- 

 cover what the Senators were told, and what they themselves said, were 

 the important features of the treaty. What were the claims made for it ? 

 Wliat was said in opposition? What criteria did supporters and op- 

 ponents apply? What were the risks and gains alleged for it? What 

 kinds of world were postulated to measure the treaty against ? 



Ohstacles to acceptance of the treaty 



The hurdles in the way of approval by the Senate of the treaty can 

 be enumerated in 5 broad categories : political aspects involving the 

 prestige of the Senate itself, military factors, scientific factors, aspects 

 growing out of the adversary role of the Soviet Union to the United 

 States, and factors posited by public opinion in the United States. 



Before a treaty may be ratified by the President, it must receive 

 the approval of two-thirds of the Senators present at the vote. Had 

 the Senate divided on the issue on strict partisan lines, a bare two- 

 thirds vote in favor could have been mustered.^ However, a number 

 of Democrats were known to be unsympathetic to the treaty, or at least 

 in doubt, so that bipartisan support would almost certainly be required 

 for its approval hy ih^ Senate.^ Dissatisfaction was expressed with the 

 draftsmanship of the treaty,^ * as well as resentment toward the im- 

 plication that because nearly 100 States had already signed the treaty 

 the Senate should not seek to amend it.^ 



1 Composition of the Senate at the time of the vote stood Democrats 67, Republicans 33. 

 The late Senator Clair Engle, a Democrat from California, was gravely ill and unable to 

 be present. 



2 An appraisal of the attitude of the Senate toward the treaty, published by the Fed- 

 eration of American Scientists, Newsletter (XVI, June 1963);, p. 4, identified nine 

 Democrats as probably opposed, of whom all but two did in fact vote against the treaty, 

 and eight as needing "encouragement," of whom two later voted against the treaty. 



3 For example. Senator Bourke B. Hlckenlooper (Republican, of Iowa), observed that 

 the "President has no authority to bind this country under the treaty until he has received 

 the advice and consent of the Senate. That makes the Senate at least an equal partner in 

 responsibility" (Congressional Record (Sept. 23, 1963), p. 16838). 



* Thus, Senator Karl E. Mundt (Republican, of South Dakota), professed himself 

 "amazed and disappointed at the loose and ambiguous language which was used in the 

 drafting of this treaty" (Congressional Record (Sept. 23, 1963). p. 16S10). 



5 Said Senator Mundt : "We should develop a procedure that would not bring us into 

 the discussion after 96 other countries sign it and widely publicized reports have been 

 circulated announcing these ceremonial signatures. Then the administration comes to 

 us for advice and consent? Oh, no. They come to us for consent and threaten us with the 

 dire consequences of a negative vote. We are not asked for any advice until after the fact 

 and our constitutional rights and duties are downgraded and Ignored by such an unwise 

 and unfortunate procedure in exercise of our treaty-ratifying responsibilities and au- 

 thorities." (Congressional Record (Sept. 23, 1963), p. 16829.) 



